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Abstract
The problem of climate change has attracted international attention mainly 
because of its cross-border effects and the impossibility of solving the problem 
by a few nations. The delay in combating climate change is attributable to 
various factors including polarized interests among nations. On the other hand, 
the Montreal Protocol (ozone depletion) regime has managed to balance and 
reconcile the interests of both the global South and the global North towards a 
common goal. Even if some differences exist between the two problems, 
lessons from the ozone depletion regime can inform the climate regime and 
enhance the participation of developing nations without adversely affecting 
their interests. The lessons include a sequential approach [i.e. addressing the 
most critical issue -emission from developed countries - first], increased 
participation and compliance, improved financial assistance and technology 
transfer regimes and enhanced political commitment to climate change. These 
lessons are in tune with the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities which should facilitate a meaningful participation from 
developing countries in the climate change regime.
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Introduction
Environmental problems are increasingly becoming the subject of global 
concern owing to their cross-border effects, and because it is also impossible for 
one or a few nations to solve these problems on their own.1 However, a global 
consensus on how to solve these environmental problems and define the 
respective obligations of nations is not easy.2 Ozone layer depletion and climate 
change are typical examples in this regard.
The achievements in the climate change and ozone depletion regimes are not 
comparable. The ozone depletion regime is “recognized as a landmark accord in 
the most effective international environmental regime to date”3 and it is 
frequently “hailed as the most successful environmental treaty ever devised,”4 In 
contrast, the climate change regime has continued to be in “the forefront of 
public debate” for its failure to bring about effective solutions.5 Thus, many
1 This is best described by the principles of ‘interdependency of ecosystem’, ‘common 
concern of mankind’, and ‘common heritage of mankind’ all calling for the global 
cooperation. See Principles 4, 21-26 of the Declaration of the United Nations 
Conference on The Human Environment, (1972), Stockholm.
2 Susskind identifies the traditional North-South split, national sovereignty and lack of 
incentives as the three basic obstacles for global cooperation. Lawrence E. Susskind 
(1994). Environmental Diplomacy: Negotiating More Effective Global Agreements, 18 
(Oxford University Press, NY, Oxford,).
3 Laura Thoms (2003). ‘A Comparative Analysis of International Regimes on Ozone 
and Climate Change with Implications for Regime Design’, 41 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 795, at 795.
4 Richard E. Benedick, (1998). Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions in Safeguarding the 
Planet, 1 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press: 2nd ed.).
5 Bryan A. Green, (2009). ‘Lessons from the Montreal Protocol: Guidance for The Next 
International Climate Change Agreement’, 39 Environmental Law 253, at 254.
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successful elements of the ozone depletion regime, including the negotiation 
process and devices used to ensure the participation and meaningful contribution 
of developing nations, could perhaps serve as a model for future climate change 
negotiations.6
The traditional North-south divide, which presents enormous challenges to 
the adoption of many multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) due to 
economic disparities, is one of the reasons for the delays that have occurred in 
fighting climate change.7 However, the Montreal Protocol regime, which deals 
with ozone layer depletion, is considered by many as a breakthrough in many 
respects, partially because it managed to balance and reconcile the interests of 
both the developing south and the developed North and brought both groups 
together to achieve a common goal.8 Based on scholarly literature, international 
agreements, decisions and reports, and other empirical data, this article assesses 
the kinds of lessons one can draw from the Montreal Protocol regime for 
application to the developing climate change regime. in particular, it addresses 
the ways in which the interests and commitments of the developing and 
developed nations were balanced by the Montreal regime.
Section 1 highlights the origin and features of ozone depletion and climate 
change and further explores the actions taken by the international community to 
address these environmental hazards including the negotiations, challenges 
encountered and the degree of success attained in the two regimes. The second 
section of the article focuses on the concerns raised by developing countries and 
their reasons for claiming preferential treatment in MEAs, the mechanisms 
devised by the Montreal regime to address these concerns, and the degree of 
success such mechanisms have had. Moreover, some differences and similarities 
of the two regimes are discussed with a view to identifying the lessons that 
contributed to the success of the Montreal regime. Section 3 assesses the 
lessons that can safely be applied to the climate regime through global 
consensus that requires enhanced participation of developing nations without 
adversely affecting their interests. Hence, a sequential approach [addressing the
6 Id; Laura Thoms, supra note 3, at 795; Sean Cumberlege, (2009). ‘Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements: From Montreal to Kyoto - a Theoretical Approach to an 
Improved Climate Change Regime’, 37 Denver Journal of International Law and 
Policy 303, at 304.
7 See for example, Harro van Asselt and Joyeeta Gupta, (2009). ‘Stretching Too Far? 
Developing Countries and The Role Of Flexibility Mechanisms Beyond Kyoto’, 28 
Stan. Envtl. L.J. 311; Michael Weisslitz, , (2002). Comment, ‘Rethinking the 
Equitable Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility: Differential Versus 
Absolute Norms of Compliance and Contribution in the Global Climate Change 
Context’, 13 Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y 473.
8 Weisslitz, Ibid, at 480.
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most critical issue -emission from developed countries - first], increased 
participation and compliance, improved financial assistance and technology 
transfer regimes, and enhanced political commitment to climate change are 
discussed in relation to the climate change regime.
1. Development of the Ozone Layer and Climate Change 
Regimes
1.1. Ozone Layer Protection
The second layer of the atmosphere, the stratosphere, contains a high amount of 
ozone (O3) and is called the ozone layer.9 In the absence of human interference, 
there is the natural balance between the formation and destruction of 
stratospheric ozone.10 Ozone depletion, therefore, occurs when more ozone is 
destructed than is created, resulting in a thinning of the ozone layer.11 The 
importance of stratospheric ozone lies in its ability to reflect ultraviolet (UV-B) 
radiation from the sun and thus prevent much of it from reaching the earth.12 
According to the UNEP Environmental Effects Assessment Panel Report for 
2006, an increase of ultraviolet radiation can produce an increase in cataracts 
and pterygium, more skin cancer, and diminished immune responses to 
infectious agents, adverse effect to terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems, and also 
to plastics and wood materials.13
9 Ozone Secretariat, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP 2000), Action on 
Ozone, Edition, Kenya Nairobi, at 1, [here after Action on Ozone] 
http://ozone.unep.org/pdfs/ozone-action-en.pdf/ last visited on July 10, 20112. See 
also US EPA (Environmental Protection Authority), Office of Research and 
Development, Stratospheric Ozone Depletion: A Focus on EPA’s Research, at 2-3. 
Available at http://www.epa.gov/Ozone/science/effects/index.html/ last visited on 
September 10, 2011.
10 See, Id.
11 See, Id.
12 The Environmental Effects Assessment Panel Report for 2006, (2006): FAQs, 
Questions and answers about the effects of the depletion of the ozone layer on 
humans and the environment, at 5.
www.ozone.unep.org/Assessment_Panels/EEAP/eeap-report2006-FAQ.pdf/ last 
visited on July 10, 2012.
13 UNEP, Ozone Secretariat, (2006). The Environmental Effects Assessment Panel 
Report for 2006, at xv and 26- 200, [hereafter The Environmental Effects Assessment 
Panel Report 2006] http://ozone.unep.org/Assessment_Panels/EEAP/eeap- 
report2006.pdf, last visited on August 20, 2009; EPA, Health and Environmental 
Effects of Ozone Layer Depletion, available at
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The scientific evidence accumulated over more than three decades shows that 
human-produced chemicals, called ozone depleting substances (hereafter 
“ODSs”), like chlorofluorocarbons (hereafter “CFCs”) and halons, are 
responsible for the observed depletions of the ozone layer.14 Scientific 
uncertainty about its harm and cause, unequal contribution by nations, 
potentially high transition costs and unavailability of alternatives to the many 
uses of oDss, unequal capacity to bear the cost of providing relief, and the 
global nature of the problem that deserves national cooperation were some of 
the challenges surmounted to bring about a regulatory multilateral 
environmental treaty.15 Yet, several countries and non-governmental 
organizations (“NGos”) called for an international action towards a 
precautionary approach in the protection of the atmosphere,16 which later on 
resulted in the vienna Convention for the protection of the ozone Layer 
(Vienna Convention hereafter) in 1985.17
The convention did not include specific provisions and commitments 
regarding oDss and it did not even determine which substances are responsible 
for ozone depletion mainly owing to the scientific uncertainties and economic 
factors. Yet, it has played a significant role in establishing a legal framework 
and setting the basic principles for subsequent negotiations.18 The Vienna 
Convention, together with advanced scientific findings and human 
understanding of the threat ultimately paved the way for the development of the 
Montreal protocol and the subsequent amendments and adjustments.
http://www.epa.gov/Ozone/science/effects/index.html/ last visited on September 
10,2011.
14 UNEP, (2005). Backgrounder: Basic Facts and Data on the Science and Politics of 
Ozone Protection, at 1; see also, The United Nations Ozone Secretariat UNEP, 
(2007). Montreal Protocol on Substance that Deplete the Ozone Layer 2007: A 
Success in the Making, at 2; Hunter, Salzman and Zaelke, (2007). International 
Environmental Law and Policy, 566-569 and 572-573 (West Publishing, 3rd Ed.) 
[here after Hunter et al].
15 Hunter et al, Ibid, at 567.
16 Lee Anne Duval, (1999). ‘The Future of the Montreal Protocol: Money and Methyl 
Bromide’, 18 Virginia Environmental Law Journal 609. However, some nations like 
USA, Canada, and the Scandinavian have taken action to ban the non-essential use of 
CFCs such as aerosol propellants in the late 1970s. Due to voluntary switching and 
later federal regulation, CFCs have been banned in US aerosol products in the USA 
since the late 1970s. Hunter et al, supra note 14, 576-77; US Environmental 
Protection Authority, Ozone Layer Protection Glossary, available at 
http://www.epa.gov/ozone/defns.html last visited on July 10, 2012;
17 Green, supra note 5; Hunter et al, supra 14, at 578.
18 Id.
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The Montreal Protocol is built upon the principles of ‘Precaution’ and 
‘Common but Differentiated Responsibility,’ and it has addressed the gaps in 
the Vienna Convention.19 More importantly, the Protocol has created 
institutional mechanisms that would adjust commitment levels and payoff 
structures in response to unforeseen developments without requiring new 
renegotiation.20 Since 1987, the parties to the Montreal Protocol have 
successfully negotiated six amendments or/and adjustment documents 
commensurate with the advancement in scientific knowledge about ozone 
depletion.21 Richard Benedick, the chief U.S. negotiator to the Montreal 
Protocol, acknowledged that the Montreal Protocol was designed to be flexible, 
“to be reopened and adjusted as needed, on the basis of the periodically 
scheduled scientific, economic, environmental, and technological 
assessments.”22
The Montreal Protocol regime is considered as an exciting success.23 The 
total number of controlled substances reached 96 24 and the 2006 UNEP
19 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, (adopted on Sept. 16, 
1987), 26 I.L.M. 1541, 1543 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989) [hereinafter Montreal 
Protocol], preamble, para 4-8. The Montreal Protocol, inter alia, required parties to 
co-operate in promoting research, development and exchange of information, listed 
five CFCs and three halons as ODSs with restrictions on production and 
consumption, and required parties to submit annual report on the same. The 
agreement also included implementation mechanisms and incentives in the form of 
trade restrictions, and a more flexible reduction scheme like the “basket strategy.” see 
also Hunter, supra note 14, at 583-585.
20 Hunter et al,, supra note 14, at 586; See also Leonard V.B. Sutton Award, (2009). 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements: From Montreal to Kyoto - A Theoretical 
Approach to an Improved Climate Change Regime, 37 Denver Journal of 
International Law and Policy 303.
21 UNEP Ozone Secretariat, The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer, as either adjusted and/or amended in, London 1990, Copenhagen 
1992, Vienna 1995, Montreal 1997, Beijing 1999, annex A - E, 2000. Available at 
http://ozone.unep.org/new_site/en/index.php_ lasted visited on July 10, 2012.
22 Benedick, supra note 4, at 99.
23 Its universal acceptance can also be mentioned as a success and as of May 2009, 196 
countries are parties to the convention and the protocol (including Ethiopia), 196 to 
London, 194 to Copenhagen, 185 to Montreal and 169 to Beijing amendments.
Ozone Secretariat UNEP site, http://montreal-
protocol.org/new_site/en/treaty_ratification_status.php/ last visited on July 10, 2012.
24 Lauren Kelly (2004). The Multilateral Fundfor the Implementation of the Montreal 
Protocol Addressing Challenges of Globalization: An Independent Evaluation of the 
World Bank’s Approach to Global Programs, Case Study, 3 (The World Bank, 
washington, D.C.).
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assessment report shows that the depleted ozone was showing signs of 
recovery.25 It is also estimated that with continued compliance with the current 
control measures of the Protocol, global average ozone is expected to return to 
pre-1980 levels by about 2050.26 The regime also “[s]ecured an aggregate 95% 
reduction in production and consumption of all ozone-depleting substances” 
thereby achieving “a measurable reduction in tropospheric and stratospheric 
levels of many ozone-depleting substances.”27 The cost incurred in its mitigation 
is much lower than the benefit gained in terms of avoided human and material 
losses.28
1.2. Climate Change
When the heat that comes from the sun is radiated back by the earth’s surface to 
the atmosphere, greenhouse gases (GHG)29 absorb some of this heat keeping the 
Earth warmer: at present, about 15°C.30 But human activities are now causing 
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases to rise, forcing it to absorb 
more heat thereby increasing average global temperature.31 Consequently, the
25 UNEP, (2007). Synthesis Summary - Presentation of the synthesis report of the 2006 
assessments of the Scientific Assessment Panel, the Environmental Effects 
Assessment Panel and the Technology and Economic Assessment Panel, at 4.
26 Id.
27 UNEP, Ozone Secretariat, (2007). Summary of issues for discussion at the dialogue 
on key future challenges to be faced by the Montreal Protocol, 3 (Nairobi). 
<http://ozone.unep.org/Meeting_Documents/dkfc/1dkfc/index.shtml/> Last visited 
on July 10, 2012.
28 Globally [projected to cover 1987-2060] the regime is able to avoid 20.6 million skin 
cancer cases, 333,500 cancer deaths, 129.1 million cataracts which totally become 
around US$ 672 billion monetized benefits and additional US$ 459 billion non-health 
benefits only with the cost of US$ 235 billion. The cost benefit analysis for USA 
alone shows US$ 21 billion costs but US$ 3,575 billion monetized benefits. Cass R. 
Sunstein, (2007). ‘Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols’, 31 Harv. Envtl. 
L. Rev. 1, at 17-19.
29 Jane A. Leggett, (2007). Climate Change: Science and Policy Implications, Updated 
May 2, 2007, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, Order 
Code RL33849, at 22.
30 The Causes of Global Climate Change, (2008). Science Brief 1 Updated August 2008 
[Science Brief here after], at 1; Edward A. Page, (2006). Climate Change, Justice and 
Future Generations, 23 (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham, UK,).
31 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Fourth Assessment Report, (2007). 
Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, Summary for Policymakers 20, 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf. Last visited on 
September 13, 2011. Carbon dioxide levels alone have increased from 280 ppm (parts
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2007 assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) concluded that warming is unequivocal, and “very likely” (with 90%- 
95% probability than the 66%-90% probability in 2001) that warming is due to 
human activity.32
The effects of climate change include increase in global mean temperature 
[commonly referred to as global warming], increase in global precipitation in 
many parts of the world, and precipitation decrease in the sub-tropics, such as 
the Sahel in Africa, and increase in frequency or intensity of climate extremes 
such as floods, drought and tropical cyclone.33 Scientists strongly suggest that 
we should not let global temperatures rise by more than 2°C to 2.5°C total above 
pre-industrial levels for mitigating these sufferings.34
with an increased public awareness and enhanced concern about climate 
change, the international dialogue initiated by the UN and other international 
organizations35 has resulted in the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) in 1992.36 As an interim measure, UNFCCC imposed a
per million) in 1750 to over 375 ppm today, and methane and Nitrous oxide (N2O) 
have increased by about 150% and 16% respectively since the Industrial Revolution
32 John C. Dernbach and Seema Kakade, (2008). ‘Climate Change Law: An 
Introduction’, Energy Law Journal, Vol. 29 No.1, 3-4. Anthropogenic emission 
includes from power plants and vehicles, aviations coming from fuel consumption 
and water vapor, land surface changing and land clearing. Jane A. Leggett, supra 
note 29, at 3; Science Brief, supra note 30, at 5.
33 See Jane A. Leggett, supra note 29, at 10-12, 19, 37; World Meteorological 
Organization, (2006). “Statement on Tropical Cyclones and Climate Change ” Report 
of the International Workshop on Tropical Cyclones” IWTC-6. Included are 
externalities like increase in heat-related diseases, changes in phenologies of species 
and its special distribution, pest outbreaks and fire, the melting of glaciers and ice 
packs, increases in sea level, etc.
34 European Commission 2007; UNSEG 2007; International Scientific Steering 
Committee 2005; World Development Report 2010 Development in a Changing 
Climate Concept note, at 8.
35 Stephen Keach and Andrea Darden, (2002). The Science of Climate Change, 
University of Virginia, 2 (Darden Business Publishing, UVA-ENT-0037). Especially, 
IPCC, which was established by UN and World Meteorological Organization, 
through its series of assessment reports published since 1990 triggered international 
action and raise public awareness.
<http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization_history.shtml/> last visited on July 
10, 2012.
36 Philippe Sands, QC, (2003). Principles of International Environmental Law, 359 
(Cambridge University Press, 2nd Edn). UNFCCC entered in to force in January 1994 
when it was ratified by 50 countries. Robert N. Stavins and Scott Barrett, Increasing 
Participation and Compliance in International Climate Change Agreements, Kennedy
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non-binding goal of reducing GHGs by industrialized nations (Annex-I 
Countries) to their pre-1990 levels by the year 2000, though many nations failed 
to reach this goal.37 The Convention also calls on developed countries to “take 
the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.”38 The 
Convention balances the economic growth needs of developing nations while 
combating climate change. To this end, it seeks financial assistance from 
developed nations so that developing countries can meet “the agreed full costs 
incurred by developing country parties in complying with their obligations” and 
the full incremental costs of technology transfer.39
The fact that it was initially signed by 161 countries, and has now been 
ratified by 195, shows that there is “a strong foundation for future international 
binding agreements to address climate change.”40 But parties to the Convention 
found out that commitment of parties provided under the Convention is 
‘inadequate’ and thereby started further negotiations41 which led them to the
School of Governance, Harvard University, Working Paper No, RWP02-031, at 3: 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=351602/.
37 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, (1992). 
FCCC/INFORMAL/84 GE.05-62220 (E) 200705, [here after UNFCCC], Article 2. 
For instance, United States had surpassed CO2 targets for the year 2000 by the end of 
1994. In addition, the International Energy Agency predicts that emission of the 
industrialized countries that make up the agency will increase by eleven to twenty- 
four percent over the next fifteen years and unlikely to achieve their historical 1990 
levels even by the year 2010. William C. Burns, (1997). Global Warming--The 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Future of small 
Island States, 6 Dick. J. Envtl. L. & Pol'y 147, at 176-178; See also Katherine H. 
Regan, (2010).The Case For Enhancing Climate Change Negotiations With A Labor 
Rights Perspective, 35 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 249, 253-254.
38 Id, at Art. 3; Regan, supra note37, at 255.
39 Id, at Article 4(3); Regan, supra note 37, at 255.
40 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Status of Ratification, 
<http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/status_of_ 
ratification/items/2631txt.php/> (Last visited September 14, 2011). This of course 
includes 194 countries and one regional economic organization.
41 The Berlin Mandate and Geneva Ministerial Declaration are some of the examples 
that came after the Convention to strengthen the commitment. Conference of the 
Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, The Berlin 
Mandate: Review of the Adequacy of Article 4, Paragraph 2(a) and (b), of the 
Convention, Including Proposals Related to a Protocol and Decisions on Follow-Up, 
in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its First Session, Held at Berlin from 28 
March to 7 April 1995, P 2(a), FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1 (June 6, 1995) mentioned in 
Sands, supra note 36, at 369; See also Regan, supra note 37, at 255; See also Geneva
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Kyoto Protocol in 1998.42 The Kyoto Protocol requires Annex I parties 
(developed countries and countries with economies in transition) to reduce their 
emission of six GHGs43 and it provides flexible market-based mechanisms (but 
with less effective implementation schemes) to promote compliance and 
participation.44 Despite its binding targets, many are skeptical about the success
Ministerial Declaration, (1996). Annex, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 
Second Session, Geneva, 8-19 July 1996, FCCC/CP/1996/15/Add.1.
42 The negotiation for Kyoto experienced contentious and tough divisions and 
challenges which entered into force when Russia joined the parties in 2005. But the 
United States maintained that the Protocol is "fatally flawed" for: (1) the extent of 
anthropogenic induced climate change is uncertain, (2) emissions allocation schemes 
that only bind Annex I countries have the potential to harm economic 
competitiveness, and (3) an effective collective action response requires reciprocal 
GHG reduction commitments from developing nations. Lisa Schenck, (2008). 
Climate Change "Crisis" - Struggling for Worldwide Collective Action, 19 Colorado 
Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 319, at 328-29, mentioning 
Bush Press Conference at White House, 29 March 2001; Sands, supra note 36, at 
370; ‘The Bonn Agreements on the Implementation of the Buenos Aires Plan of 
Action’, Decision 5/CP.6, Report of the Conference of the Parties on the Second Part 
of its Sixth Session, (2001). Bonn, 16-24 July 2001, FCCC/CP/2001/5, 36-49 and 
Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session, Marrakesh, 29 
October-10 November 2001, FCCC/CP/2001/13; Elizabeth Burleson, (2010). 
‘Climate Change Consensus: Emerging International Law’, 34 William and Mary 
Environmental Law and Policy Review 543, 546.
43 It sets for the European Community and its member states an emissions limitation of 
92 per cent of the 1990 base year, or an 8 per cent reduction, the United States to a 7 
per cent reduction, Japan and Canada each to a 6 per cent reduction, Australia and 
Iceland were permitted to make increases of respectively 8 per cent and 10 per cent, 
Russia, the largest emitter of the Eastern bloc countries, to stabilize its emissions at 
100 per cent of 1990 levels. Sands, supra note 36, at 371-372; Kyoto Protocol to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, (1998). Dec. 10, 1997, 
37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) (entered into force Feb. 15, 2005) [hereafter Kyoto Protocol], at 
Article 3(1).
44 The most innovative, flexible and economically viable mechanisms adopted in the 
Protocol are the Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”), Joint Implementation 
(“JI”) and emissions trading (“ET”) which are aimed at reducing global emission 
levels and facilitating the transfer of funds and technology to developing countries. 
CDM system allows Annex I parties to invest in emissions reductions projects in 
non-Annex I parties and use the certified emissions reductions (CERs) accruing from 
such project activities ‘to contribute to compliance with part of their quantified 
emission limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3.’ While JI allows 
Annex I party to transfer to, or acquire from, any other Annex I party ‘emission 
reduction credits resulting from projects aimed at reducing anthropogenic emissions 
by sources or enhancing anthropogenic removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in any
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of the Kyoto Protocol in achieving targeted global reductions in GHG 
emissions.45 Indeed, global CO2 emissions alone are projected to increase by 
forty-six percent over 1990 levels by 201046 and many parties, except some 
European nations, are projected to miss their assigned emission targets.47
on the other hand, negotiations and meeting of parties continued on a post- 
Kyoto regulation which aims at strengthening emission reduction commitments, 
which would include the us and some high-emitter developing nations, like 
China and India.48 Very recently, the parties at the Copenhagen Conference of 
2009, failed to meet expectations and they only agreed on a non-binding 
instrument called the Copenhagen Accord, also known as ‘a letter of intent’.49 
The traditional North-south dichotomy was evident in the Copenhagen 
Conference where China called upon the USA to live up to its obligation 
assumed by the uNFCCC in significantly reducing emission and providing 
financial assistance to the developing nations, while the US called for 
developing nations to assume their own commitments.50 Despite all these 
efforts, the existing climate regime still lacks at least (1) a binding emission 
reduction schedule for nations, including reduced emissions from deforestation
sector of the economy’; Emissions trading, on the other hand, permits an Annex B 
party to ‘buy’ emissions reduction credits, in the form of assigned amounts units from 
another Annex B party where it considers this is more cost-effective or cheaper for it 
rather than to undertake the reduction domestically. Stavins and Berrett, supra note 
36, at 2; Kyoto Protocol, supra note 43, Article 12, 16 and 17; Petra Lea Lancos, 
(2008). Flexibility And Legitimacy - The Emissions Trading System Under The 
Kyoto Protocol, 9 German Law Journal 1625, at 1637-38; Sands, supra note 36, at 
373; Regan, supra note 37, at 256.
45 Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 28, at 4-5.
46 Christopher E. Angell, (2010). ‘Assessing Climate Agreement Principles: The 
Tension Between Early Equivalent Actions and Variable Costs’, 35 Columbia 
Journal of Environmental Law 213, at 220.
47 For example, Canada will miss its target of 6% reduction below 1990 levels, with its 
emissions 30% percent above its Kyoto Protocol target level as of 2007; Japan will 
need to purchase significant offsets through the Clean Development Mechanism and 
other trading provisions of the Protocol to meet its target. But Europe has had 
ongoing emissions reduction progress yet many expected it to miss its Protocol 
targets. Id, at 220; Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 28, 36-38.
48 Id; See Daniel Bodansky, (2010). ‘The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: A 
Postmortem’, 104 Am. J. Int'l L. 230, 230.
49 Elizabeth Burleson, supra note 42, at 548;
50 Id, at 547. USA also offered its 2005 emission to be used as a baseline instead of 
1990 while Australia offered 2001 instead.
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and degradation (REDD),51 (2) details on financial support and technology 
transfer, and (3) agreements on monitoring, reporting, and verification.52
2. Interests of Developing Nations in MEAs and the Success 
of Ozone Layer Regime
2.1. Special Concerns of Developing Nations in MEAs
The widening split between the developed North and developing South and the 
polarized interests thereof have prevented the international community from 
protecting the ‘global commons.’53 Developing nations, owing to different 
factors, claim that they bear little or no responsibility for mitigating 
environmental problems which are believed to have been created largely by the 
developed world.54 This section will describe the arguments raised by the 
developing South in claiming such preferential treatment in MEAs, especially in 
ozone and climate change regimes, and its significance in creating equity and 
fairness in global relations.
51 COP-13 held in Bali, Indonesia for the first time outlined approaches to stimuli 
REDD in developing nations. Since then REDD becomes part of the climate change 
negotiation. The Copenhagen Accord further recognized its importance, however 
only called to provide positive incentive and establish mechanisms for mobilizing 
resources for the same without further details. UNFCCC, Conference of the Parties, 
Fifteenth session, Copenhagen, 7.18 December 2009, FCCC/CP/2009/L.7, December 
18th 2009, [here after Copenhagen Accord], at article 6; Daniel Bodansky, supra note 
48, at 237; Melissa Farris, (2010). ‘The Sound Of Falling Trees: Integrating 
Environmental Justice Principles Into The Climate Change Framework For Reducing 
Emissions From Deforestation And Degradation (REDD)’, 20 Fordham Envtl. L. 
Rev. 515, at 520.
52 Elizabeth Burleson, supra note 42, at 547; Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jisun Kim, 
(2010). Global Warming: Climate Change and the Law, After The Flop In 
Copenhagen, SR039 American Law Institute - American Bar Association Continuing 
Legal Education 339, ALI-ABA Course of Study March 4 - 5.
53 See, Susskind, supra note 2, at 18. The other factors are the stubborn persistence of 
national sovereignty, global nature of the problem, and an apparent lack of incentives 
sufficient to bring some nations to the bargaining table.
54 See, Mark A. Drumbl, (2002). ‘Northern Economic Obligation, Southern Moral 
Entitlement, And International Environmental Governance’, 27 Columbia Journal of 
Environmental Law 363; Andrew Schatz, edr, (2008). ‘Foreword: Beyond Kyoto - 
The Developing World And Climate Change’, 20 Georgetown International 
Environmental Law Review 531, at 533.
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It is true that, historically speaking, developing countries contributed little or 
nothing to environmental problems, like ozone depletion and climate change.55 
For instance, developed countries with less than 25% of the world’s population 
were consuming 88% of the CFCs, which is over 20 times the per capita 
consumption of the developing countries.56 Similarly, developed countries are 
responsible for two-thirds of global carbon emissions from fossil fuel use in 
1993.57 Although there is a higher emission growth in some developing nations 
like China, India and Brazil in their pursuits “to meet their social and 
development needs”, per capita carbon emissions are still lower compared to the 
developed world.58 59 Perhaps the long atmospheric lifetime of these ODSs and 
GHGs creates certain moral and historical responsibilities for the developed 
nations.
Hence, developing nations claim that developed countries are 
disproportionately responsible for creating ozone depletion and climate change 
problems, and they should take the lead in devising the solutions as well.60 This 
principle of equity leads to the argument that developed nations have attained 
their economic growth by using oDss and GHGs and the same opportunity
55 Margaret M. Pinkham, (1991). ‘The Montreal Protocol: An Effort to Protect the 
Ozone Layer’, 15 Suffolk Transnat'l L.J. 255, 269-270 ; Drumbl, Northern Economic 
Obligation, supra note 54, at 364-366.
56 Hunter, supra note 14, at 590.
57 iPCC tell a similar story, and estimate that developed countries were responsible for 
67.8 per cent of total CO2 emissions between 1900 and 1988. It is, however, 
projected that by 2020 there is a high probability that developing nations’ aggregate 
emission would surpass that of developed. For example, the projection for China 
alone is 19.3%, 20.8% and 22.2% for years 2010, 2015 and 2020 consecutively while 
the same of USA is 21%, 20% and 19.4%. United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) (2007). Human Development Report for 2007/2008, Fighting Climate 
Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World, [here after Human Development 
Report], Palgrave Macmillan, NY, USA, at 7; Edward A. Page, supra note, at 168; 
Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 28, at 52.
58 For instance, the carbon footprint of the United States is five times that of China and 
over 15 times that of india and in Ethiopia, the average per capita carbon footprint is 
0.1 tonnes of CO2 compared with 20 tonnes in Canada. UNFCCC, supra note 37, 
Preamble; Id, at 7; Hunter, supra note 14, at 664.
59 Edward A. Page, supra note 30, at 168. For instance, CO2 continues to contribute to 
global warming up to 200 years after being emitted, whereas sulphur hexafluoride 
contributes for 3000 years or more.
60 Proceedings of the Ninety-Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Society of 
International Law, (2002). Common but Differentiated Responsibility, 96 Am. Soc'y 
Int'l L. Proc. 358, at 358.
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should be granted to developing nations.61 For this reason, during the 
negotiation of the London Amendment to the Montreal Protocol in 1990, India's 
Environmental Minister claimed that the North “had usurped India's 
‘opportunity’ to develop CFC production” and should pay compensation for the 
same.62
The other related concern of developing nations is the fear that stringent 
environmental responsibilities might retard their economic growth and 
development.63 It has been noted that, “there exists a hierarchy of human needs 
in developing countries by which needs for food, clothing, and shelter take 
priority over social and aesthetic needs.”64 That means, when a developing 
country is struggling to meet the basic needs of its population, “[p]olicies to 
protect the environment may not be feasible for a country dealing with 
overpopulation, malnutrition, and lack of basic sanitation.”65 Thus, developing
61 Weisslitz, supra note 7, at 480-81; Hunter et al,, supra note 14, at 664-665; Edward 
A. Page, supra note 30, at 168. Given that most GHG and ODS remains in the 
atmosphere for decades, developed nations have ‘banked’ more than enough of their 
equitable share to pollute’ the atmosphere. For instance, USA has emitted more than 
30% of all CO2 emission over the past century and 301 279 million metric tonnes in 
the period 1800-2000 which is roughly four times as much as the next biggest 
emitters, Russia (86 705) and Germany (75 606). The cumulative contribution of 
developing countries over this period is, by contrast, very small, for instance, the 
whole of Sub-Saharan Africa emitted just 17 665, and Central America and the 
Caribbean just 13 376, million metric tonnes of CO2. World Resources 2003-2004: 
Decisions for the Earth: Balance, Voice and Power (Washington DC: World 
Resource Institute), at 258-259 (available online at: http://governance.wri.org/).]
62 Dale S. Bryk, (1991). ‘The Montreal Protocol and Recent Developments to Protect 
the Ozone Layer’, 15 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 275, at 291.
63 Lee Anne Duval, supra note 16.
64 See Bing Ling, (1992). ‘Developing Countries and Ozone Layer Protection: Issues, 
Principles and Implications’, 6 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 91, at 93-94.
65 Margaret M. Pinkham, supra note 55. Thomas Franck also observed that “[n]ations 
like China, India, Algeria, and Brazil have argued that development, by which they 
usually mean industrialization, is more important to the well-being of their people 
than a fastidious concern for the environment.” Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in 
International Law and Institutions (1995), at 368. Likewise, the head of the Brazilian 
Delegation observed that: Mankind has legitimate needs that are material, aesthetic 
and spiritual. A country that has not yet reached minimum satisfactory levels in the 
supply of essentials is not in a position to divert considerable resources to 
environmental protection. M. Tolba ed., (1988). Statement by Head of Brazilian 
Delegation in Evolving Environmental Perceptions: From Stockholm to Nairobi 51, 
at 135; John Ntambirweki, (1991). ‘The Developing Countries In The Evolution Of
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nations are prepared to sacrifice the environment in order to increase their 
economic growth and raise their standard of living.66
They went far in considering some environmental regimes, like the Montreal 
protocol Regime, as an instrument for the developed nations to subvert their 
economic development.67 The developing world is unwilling to pursue life 
without using the products that have ODSs, which make life much easier in its 
many uses.68 Likewise, there is a strong correlation between current levels of 
development and GHG emission.69 Early industrialization results in higher 
emissions, which has brought current prosperity to the developed world but not 
yet to the developing world.70 That is why developing nations “have not yet 
accepted any requirement through climate negotiation that will [may] slow 
down their economic growth.”71 Yet they cannot pursue polluting the 
environment as “consensus has emerged that the planet can withstand little more 
of these externalities or has hit some sort of tipping point.”72
This hesitation seems rational and morally coherent when one observes that 
developing countries simply do not have the resources to practice environment 
friendly economic growth due to factors such as the tremendous cost of reducing 
GHG emission or adaptation to it. These same costs even intimidate the wealthy 
nations like the US.73 Thus, the financial and technical incapability of 
developing countries to respond to climate change problems or produce or buy
An International Environmental Law’, 14 Hastings International and Comparative 
Law Review 905, at 906.
66 Lee Anne Duval, supra note 16.
67 Id.
68 James Andrew Bove, (2003). ‘A Study of the Financial Mechanism of the Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer’, 9 Environmental Lawyer 399; 
David Hurlbut, (1993). ‘Beyond the Montreal Protocol: Impact on Nonparty States 
and Lessons for Future Environmental Protection Regimes’, 4 Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. 
& Pol'y 344, at 352.
69 Philippe Cullet, (2003). Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law, 
46 (Aldershot: Ashgate).
70 Michael McKenzie, (2008). ‘Climate Change and the Generalized System of 
Preferences’, 11 Journal of International Economic Law 679, at 681.
71 Hunter et al, supra note 14, at 664; Mark A. Drumbl, (2002). ‘Poverty, Wealth, and 
Obligation In International Environmental Law’, 76 Tulane Law Review 843, at 849.
72 Id; Michael J. Kelly, (1997). ‘Overcoming Obstacles to the Effective Implementation 
of International Environmental Agreements’, 9 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 447, at 450 
and 455.
73 E. William Colglazier, (1991). ‘Scientific Uncertainties, Public Policy, and Global 
Warming: How Sure Is Sure Enough?’, Pol'y Studies J., 61, at 65; Drumbl, Poverty, 
Wealth, and Obligation, supra note 71, at 849-50.
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the relatively expensive alternatives to ODS is a point of concern. For instance, 
studies revealed that accelerated phase-out schedule of methyl bromide might 
take away a substantial portion of food supply in developing countries.74 Hence, 
the fact that many of the developing countries do not have the research 
resources to develop alternatives, and that most of the research is occurring in 
the industrialized nations render it extremely difficult to subject both groups to 
similar phase-out schedules.75
Another argument that developing countries put forth is the “polluter pays 
principle.”76 The principle suggests that the industrialized nations have caused 
the problems of pollution, and “they should pay the developing countries to 
avoid making the same development decisions that would further contribute to 
the problem.”77 For instance, in the methyl bromide debate, this principle 
requires developed countries to provide assistance to find alternatives so that the 
developing countries can continue to develop without compromising their food 
supply.78 After recognizing that the industrialized nations are responsible for 
most of the damage on the atmosphere,79 Singer claims that: “as far as the 
atmosphere is concerned, the developed nations broke it. If we believe that 
people should contribute to fixing something in proportion to their responsibility 
for breaking it, then the developed nations owe it to the rest of the world to fix 
the problem with the atmosphere.”80
74 Lee Anne Duval, supra note 16. Methyl bromide is powerful ozone depleting 
substance or pesticide used in the control of pest insects, nematodes, weeds, 
pathogens, and rodents in agricultural productions equally in use in developing and 
developed nations. Developing countries, however, claimed that banning of methyl 
bromide before finding its right and economically viable substitute will benefit only 
the developed north where their companies will sell the expensive substitute at the 
price which is only affordable to their farmers.
75 See Chris Hall (1997), ‘Availability of Alternatives to Methyl Bromide Worries 
Farming Industry’, 20 Int'l Env'tRep. (BNA) No. 3, at 126 (Feb. 5, 1997); see also Id
76 See Anne Gallagher, (1992). “The ‘New’ Montreal Protocol and the Future of 
International Law for Protection of the Global Environment”, 14 Hous. J. Int'l L. 267, 
at 270.
77 See, Id; Lee Anne Duval, supra note 16; Weisslitz, supra note 7.
78 See Anne Duval, supra note 16.
79 Hunter et al, supra note 14, at 664.
80 Peter Singer, (2002). One World, 33-34 (London: Yale University Press), Edward A. 
Page, supra note 30, at 168.
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Rather than stemming from disregard for the global environment, developing 
nations’ reticence in assuming responsibility stems from priorities,81 and lack of 
financial resources associated with attaining the abatement standards central to 
many multilateral agreements.82 Such requests of the developing nations that 
MEAs should consider their special situations83 brought about the principle of 
‘common but differentiated responsibility’ into the MEAs which has contributed 
to the success of the Montreal Regime.84 The contribution of this principle in 
the efforts to combat global ozone depletion and in the protection of the interests 
of developing countries is highlighted below.
2.2. Mechanisms Devised by the Ozone Layer Regime
There are multiple factors behind the success stories of the Montreal regime 
that can be transferred to other regimes. These factors include international 
scientific cooperation and consensus, an incremental policy process, the targets 
and timetables approach, involvement of multilateral institutions, and more 
effective manifestations of the common but differentiated responsibility 
principle.85 Above all, the meaning given to the principle of ‘common but 
differentiated responsibility’ is central for the inclusion of developing countries 
and for the success of the regime.86 In the context of the Montreal Protocol, one 
aspect of this principle is to allow developing countries to delay the 
implementation of control measures,87 while developed countries provide 
financial assistance and technology transfer mechanisms to developing
countries.88
81 Kilaparti Ramakrishna, (1992). ‘Interest Articulation and Lawmaking in Global 
Warming Negotiations: Perspectives from Developing Countries’, 2 Transnat'l L. & 
Contemp. Probs. 153, at 168.
82 Drumbl, Northern Economic Obligation, supra note 54, at 365.
83 Id.
84 Bankobeza, DR. Gilbert, Strengthening the Implimentation of Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements, United Nations Environment Programme Ozone 
secretariat, seventh international Conference on Environmental Compliance and 
Enforcement, at 253 - 258; Lauren Kelly, supra note 24, at 2.
85 Laura Thoms, supra note 3, at 805.
86 Id. Common but differentiated responsibility is well defined as: “All States have 
common responsibilities to protect the environment and promote sustainable 
development, but because of different social, economic, and ecological situations, 
countries must shoulder different responsibilities." Hunter, supra note 14, at 402.
87 Bankobeza, DR. Gilbert, supra note 84.
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2.2.1. More Flexible Freeze and Phase-out Schedules
The Montreal Protocol regime recognized the special situation of developing 
countries in their pursuits to meet its basic domestic needs and their compliance 
was offered a grace period of ten years as long as it does not “exceed an annual 
calculated level of consumption of 0.3 kilograms per capita.”89 Hence, the most 
significant ODSs were scheduled for phase-out in 1996 in the developed 
countries but only in 2010 in developing countries, otherwise known as Article 
5 Parties.90 In addition, Article 5 Parties were required to freeze the use of 
methyl bromide in 2002, leading to phase-out in 2015 and HCFCs in 2016 and 
phased out in 2040, which is at least ten years later than the timeline for the 
developed nations.91 With regard to the calculation of its baseline “...either the 
average of its annual calculated level of consumption for the period of 1995 to 
1997 inclusive or a calculated level of consumption of 0.3 kilograms per capita, 
whichever is the lower” was considered. However, the baseline for developed 
countries was mostly the calculated level of consumption in 1986.92
The period of grace is intended to allow developing countries to provide for 
their basic domestic needs during the transition away from ODSs and to enable 
them learn from the experience gained in the developed countries in the course 
of implementing the Montreal Protocol regime.93 However, there were 
challenges in the implementation of the grace period. For instance, US farmers 
requested that “methyl bromine is necessary for them to compete with 
developing countries” and successfully lobbied for its continued use in the name 
of exemptions past the 2005 deadline.94 The other challenge was the critique that 
the grace period granted to developing countries in the production and use of 
ODSs while the consumption freezes in developed nations increases the traffic 
of illegal trade.95 Irrespective of such critics, however, developing nations have
89 Montreal Protocol, supra note 19, article 5(1).
90 Lauren Kelly, supra note 24, at 2.
91 Hunter et al, supra note 14, at 594.
92 Ozone Secretariat UNEP, (2005). Production and Consumption of Ozone Depleting 
Substances under the Montreal Protocol 1986 - 2004, Third Edition, at 8, available at 
www.ozone.unep.org/Publications/Production_and_consumption2005.pdf/ lasted 
visited on September 13, 2011; see also Hunter et al, supra note 14, at 590-596. For 
some ODSs the baseline, however, for developed nations were 1989 and 1991. In 
such instance, the baseline will become 1998-2000 and 2015 for Article 5 Parties.
93 Lauren Kelly, supra note 24, at 2.
94 Hunter, supra note 14, at 597.
95 Ozone Action Newsletter, (2001). The Scope of the Problem: An Overview of Illegal 
ODS Trade, Illegal Trade in Ozone Depleting Substances: Is There a Hole in the 
Montreal Protocol?, at 4 www.unep.fr/ozonaction/.../3617-e-
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benefited from the flexible freeze and phase-out schedules that were designed in 
the ozone layer regime to the benefit of developing countries.
2.2.2. Financial Assistance
The Montreal Protocol’s London Amendment in June 1990 created the 
Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol.96 It has the 
general objective of helping developing countries to comply with their 
obligations under the Protocol to phase out the use of ODSs at an agreed 
schedule97 and the fund finances activities mandated to decrease production and 
consumption of ODSs.98 In order to make financing available before the entry 
into force of the London Amendment, the parties also agreed to establish an 
Interim Fund, which became effective on January 1, 1991.99
The Fund was a financial mechanism which embodied the principle that 
countries have a common but differentiated responsibility to protect and manage 
the global commons.100 It is managed by an Executive Committee with an equal 
representation of seven industrialized and seven Article 5 Parties, which are 
elected annually by a meeting of the parties.101 Financial and technical 
assistance is provided in the form of grants or concessional loans and is 
delivered through its implementing agencies.102
The Fund, which is replenished seven times every three years, receives 
monetary contributions from industrialized member nations (Non-Article 5 
Parties) based upon the United Nations Scale of Assessment.103 It finances
oansupplement6IllegalTrade.pdf/ last visited on July 10, 2012; See also Lauren 
Kelly, supra note 24, at 23.
96 See, The Multilateral Fund for the Montreal Protocol, available at 
http://www.multilateralfund.org/default.aspx/ last visited on September 9, 2011.
97 Multilateral Fund Secretariat, (2002). Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the 
Montreal Protocol, Policies, Procedures, Guidelines and Criteria, at 2, 
UNEP/OzL.Pro/2/3/Decision II/8. Available at
http://www.unmfs.org/PDF/Policy37.pdf/ lasted visited on August 18, 2009.
98 See, The Multilateral Fund, supra note 96.
99 Id. The Multilateral Fund becomes fully operational only in 1993.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 See, James Andrew Bove, supra note 68; see also Multilateral Fund for the 
Implementation of the Montreal Protocol, Implementing Agencies, at 
<http://www.multilateralfund.org/aboutMLF/default.aspx>. Last visited on June 10, 
2012.
103 Adjustments and Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete 
the Ozone Layer, U.N. Environment Program, (1990). U.N. Doc.
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activities like project preparation, training and capacity building programs, 
technical assistance, information exchange, demonstration projects, institutional 
strengthening, small investment projects, and industrial conversion.104 It, 
however, funds only the additional (the so-called 'incremental') 105 costs incurred 
in converting to non-ODS technologies.106.
The Fund has been an integral part of the success of the Montreal 
Protocol. The establishment of the Fund in 1990 persuaded many developing 
countries, like China and India, to join the combat against ozone depletion.107 
Up to 2008, the Executive Committee has approved over USD 2.6 billion to 
finance over 6,700 projects and activities in 145 countries.108 The 
implementation of these projects “will result in the phase-out of the 
consumption of more than 254,687 ODP tons and the production of about 
176,439 ODP tons of ODSs”.109
Other Fund achievements include the approval of 143 country programs in 
Article 5 countries and the establishment of ozone offices in 143 Article 5
UNEP/Oz.L.Pro2/3, 30 I.L.M. 537; agreed by the Second Meeting of the Parties, 
[hereafter London Amendment] article 10(6).
104 See, James Andrew Bove, supra note 68; see also Executive Committee of the 
Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol, Report of the 
Tenth Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Multilateral Fund for the 
Implementation of the Montreal Protocol, (1993). U.N. Environment Program, 
Annex I, at 10, U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/10/40 .
105 U.N. Environment Programme, Executive Committee of the Multilateral Fund for 
the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol, Report of the Twenty-Fourth Meeting 
of the Executive Committee of the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the 
Montreal Protocol, (1998). Annex I, at 4, U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/24/27; 
See also James Andrew Bove, supra note 68.
106 See, The Multilateral Fund, supra note 96.
107 See, Lauren Kelly, supra note 24, at 3. China and India successfully lobbied the 
addition of US $80 million to the already allotted US $160 million of the Fund as a 
precondition to join the regime.
108 See, The Multilateral Fund, supra note 96. In China alone, the largest consumer and 
producer of ODSs among Article 5 Parties, under the Multilateral Fund, as of 
November 1995, 155 projects had been implemented and “of the 459,910 ODP 
tonnes to be eliminated once all these projects have been implemented, a total of 
448,808 ODP tonnes had already been phased out by the end of December 2010”. 
James Shepherd, (2007). The Future of Technology Transfer Under Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements, ELR, News and Analysis, reprinted by, Environmental 
Law Institute®, Washington, DC, 37 ELR, 10547-10561
109 Id.
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Parties.110 Ethiopia has benefited from the Fund, and so far out of the approved 
amount of USD 605,067, USD 375,810 has been disbursed to Ethiopia.111 
Therefore, the Multilateral Fund has contributed to the phase-out of ODSs by 
encouraging the participation of developing countries and sponsoring domestic 
capacity-building exercises and by creating the sense of cooperation and 
commitment amongst the parties.112
2.2.3. Technology Transfer
Due to the lack of a strong clause in the original Montreal Protocol,113 Article 5 
Parties, led by India, China and Brazil requested technology transfer schemes to 
be “available on a preferential and non-commercial basis” and further requested 
developed nations to go to the extent of changing their laws for its 
effectiveness.114 Developed nations, however, objected that they could not 
compel their industries to transfer technology on a non-commercial basis, and 
proposed that technology will only be transferred to countries that respect 
intellectual property rights, and through joint ventures and licensing 
arrangements.115 In the end, the London Amendment was a compromise of these 
two conflicting interests,116 and is considered as “the first treaty where 
developed countries accepted their responsibility for protecting the environment 
by assisting developing countries with technology transfers”.117
Although transfer of technology is a very complex process surrounded by 
many challenges, UNEP and UNDP have accomplished different projects in the 
implementation of the technology transfer schemes in the ozone regime.118 This
110 Id.
111 The Multilateral Fund Secretariat, Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the 
Montreal protocol: Country Programme and Compliance Summary Sheets (As at 
July 2007), at 88.
112 Id.
113 It only set that “The Parties shall....taking into account in particular the needs of 
developing countries, co-operate in promoting technical assistance.” and parties 
may “.request to the Secretariat for technical assistance for the purposes of 
implementing or participating in the Protocol.” Montreal Protocol, supra note 19, 
article 10.
114 Hunter et al, supra note 14, at 611.
115 Id.
116 London Amendments, supra note 103, Article 10(A).
117 Hunter et al, supra note 14, at 591.
118 David Strelneck and Peter Linquiti, Environmental Technology Transfer to 
Developing Countries: Practical Lessons Learned During Implementation of the 
Montreal Protocol, (ICF Consulting Working Paper, Presented at the 17th Annual
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is especially true for the transformation of Chinese and Indian refrigerator, foam 
and air conditioning industries.119 One of the major successes of the Montreal 
Protocol is the transfer of technology to the indian refrigeration industry, under 
the auspices of the Ecofrig Project.120 With the collaboration of German, Indian, 
and Swiss governments, the Ecofrig Project helped indian companies to acquire 
the necessary knowledge and replace the CFCs that were used in its refrigeration 
industry with new non-CFC equipment.121
Hence, effective implementation of the technology transfer regime helped 
developing nations to comply with their commitment without much cost and 
allowed developed nations to achieve their common goal. These are some of the 
factors that have had direct impact on the inclusion of developing nations 
thereby contributing to the success of the ozone regime. Other factors such as 
the comparative advantage of US companies over others and the green business 
movements by private actors have contributed to the success of the ozone 
regime.
2.3. Differences and Similarities between the Ozone Layer 
and Climate Change Regimes
Stratospheric ozone depletion and climate change are the two most significant 
environmental challenges facing the world today.122 In spite of the ambitious 
global plan to reverse these environmental harms, the degree of government 
cooperation and the fundamental change that is required in human economic and
Research Conference of the Association for Public Policy and Management), at 4-6. 
available at <www.icfconsulting.com>. Last visited on August 18, 2009; see also 
Gilbert M. Bankobeza, (2005). Ozone Protection: The International Legal Regime, 
208, at 240-242.
119 O. Yoshida, (2001). The International Legal Regime for the Protection of the 
Stratospheric Ozone Layer, 6 Int’l L. Japanese Persp. 273. This includes the efforts 
taken to replace Chinese CFC-based foam-blowing machinery with new non-CFC 
equipment and projects to initiate the recovery, recycling, and reuse of CFCs during 
equipment servicing in the refrigeration and air conditioning service industries have 
been undertaken. See David Strelneck, supra note 118.
120 See, James Shepherd, supra note 108.
121 See, Id; and International Energy Agency, (2001). Technology Without Borders 11, 
at 22.
122 Cumberlege, supra note 6, at 303. The fact that ozone layer will not return to its pre 
1980s status before 2050 and the need for continuous compliance to the regime 
makes stratospheric ozone depletion a significant environmental concern even 
today.
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social behavior render ozone depletion addressable while climate change
• • 123remains contentious.
One of the common features of the two issues is the need for multilateral 
action to protect global commons.* 124 Even if the contribution of developing 
nations is minimal in both cases as the source of the problems, the regime will 
not succeed without meaningful participation of developing nations.125 
Consequently, the inclusion of developing nations for effective international 
ozone depletion or climate change regulation is not an option.126
The other similar characteristic is the unequal contribution by developed and 
developing countries, which further complicates the global response.127 Hence, 
both present contentious issues of international (intra-generational) equity in 
that developed countries are the primary contributors to both environmental 
problems and therefore, should assume predominant roles in mitigation 
efforts.128 This, then, requires a meaningful and advanced participation of 
developed nations not only in mitigating the direct cause of these environmental 
problems but also providing financial assistance and technology transfer to 
developing nations in their pursuits to curb the common problem.129 Likewise, 
the economic ability of developing nations to effectively deal with these 
environmental problems and their current priority in providing basic means to 
citizens are common concerns of the regimes.130 As a result, developing nations 
pledge to assume lower or no binding responsibilities in mitigating the 
problems.131
It is to be noted that both environmental concerns involve the ‘tragedy of the 
commons’ where some states ‘free ride’ on the efforts of others by benefiting
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 28, at 2.
Id, at 2; Jasmine Abdel-khalik, (2001). Prescriptive Treaties in Global Warming: 
Applying the Factors Leading to the Montreal Protocol, 22 Michigan Journal of 
International Law 489, at 514.
Jasmine, Ibid, at 514; Hunter, supra note 14, at 664.
Laura Thoms, supra note 3, at 799.
Michael McKenzie, supra note 70, at 681.
Cumberlege, supra note 6, at 303. Added is the intergenerational equity raised on 
both problems due to the long life span of the anthropogenic emission and their long 
effect. Hence, the future generation is expected to suffer much unless the current 
generation makes meaningful sacrifice for the benefit of the future generation. See 
Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 28, at 3.
See, John Ntambirweki, supra note 65.
See, Id.
Id, at 912
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from the significant costs borne by parties that comply with their obligations.132 
Hence, any solution to these problems has to deal with the tendency of states to 
‘free ride’ on the benefits accrued from mitigating actions of other states, and 
the solutions are also accompanied by the uncertainty whether other parties to a 
binding agreement will actually observe their commitments.133
Lack of practical alternatives to the various uses of ODSs and energy 
consumption during the early period of negotiations were challenges which, 
inter alia, necessitated the participation of corporations. Ultimately, scientific 
and technological advances have shown viable alternatives to replace coal and 
fossil fuels while still producing the requisite amount of energy.134 Although 
these technologies are environmentally friendly and economically feasible, the 
ultimate objectives of scaling them up, bringing them to the market and 
replacing the existing coal and fossil fuel energy involve further tasks and 
sustained testing.135
In spite of the differences, the global responses to the problems of ozone 
depletion and climate change problems also share some common features, 
which include: enhanced scientific cooperation and involvement in the 
negotiations, an incremental approach and the creation of targets and timetables, 
the principle of “common but differentiated responsibility”, and multiple 
mechanisms to encourage and assist the participation of developing countries.136
132 Cumberlege, supra note 6, at 303; see also James K. Sebenius, (1991). ‘Designing 
Negotiations Toward a New Regime: The Case of Global Warming’, 15 Int'l 
Security 110, at 119; John Vogler, Studying the global commons: governance 
without politics? In Peter Dauvergne, edr. (2005). Handbook of Global 
Environmental Politics, University of British Columbia, Canada, at 51-55 (Edward 
Elgar Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA,).
133 Laura Thoms, supra note 3, at 799.
134 Jasmine, supra note 124, at 516-518. Suggestion are coming to the utilization of 
natural gas, electricity or hydrogen facility, biomass as a fuel source with subsurface 
sequestration, wind turbine technology, and new technologies to reduce automobile 
emission, and other green energy sources like solar. See also Joshua P. Fershee, 
(2010). ‘Struggling Past Oil: The Infrastructure Impediments to Adopting Next- 
Generation Transportation Fuel Sources’, 40 Cumb. L. Rev. 87; Mark E. Rosen, 
(2010). ‘Energy Independence And Climate Change: The Economic And National 
Security Consequences Of Failing To Act’, 44 U. Rich. L. Rev. 977.
135 Jasmine, supra note 124, at 518.
136 Laura Thoms, supra note 3, at 817; see also Jorgen Wettestad, (1999). Designing 
Effective Environmental Regimes: The Key Conditions, 221-23; Ved P. Nanda & 
George Pring, (2003). International Environmental Law for the 21st Century, at 293­
94; and Cumberlege, supra note 6, at 317-18.
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Yet, there are important differences among the two that, partly, contribute to the 
different success stories of the regimes.
Climate change is a much more difficult phenomenon to regulate because it 
is more scientifically complex than ozone depletion and is still characterized by 
high scientific uncertainty and sharp asymmetrical vulnerabilities.137 This 
plagues global efforts to reach consensus on lasting climate change 
alleviation.138 There is more convincing scientific evidence about climate 
change today than during the Kyoto negotiations. However, some scientific 
uncertainty still remains to show the causation between emissions and large 
visible environmental problems.139 Scientific uncertainty and causation had also 
delayed the ozone regime until overwhelming evidence, e.g. ozone hole, was 
found in 1985 to show stronger causation between CFCs/ODS and ozone 
depletion.140 In spite of the delay in levels of certainty regarding the causation in 
global warming, many scientific data and reports, including that of ipCC, are 
now strongly filling the gap in evidence and they seem to nearly irrefutable,141 
or are becoming a “smoking gun,”142 soon to be followed by a growing 
consensus on the need to act swiftly and strongly.143
The other, and perhaps the most important difference, is the fact that climate 
change mitigation affects core global economic activity which inherently 
involves issues of competition between nations.144 Specifically, climate change 
alleviation implicates multiple sectors of the global economy, particularly those 
that have, throughout modern history, served as the backbone to industrial 
growth and development, making the cost of mitigation tough to bear.145 The 
use of oDss was confined to a relatively small amount of products, like 
refrigerators, fire extinguishers, foam, etc. whereas greenhouse gas emissions 
arise from nearly all areas of modern life. As a result, any approach to climate 
change has wider and more significant economic implications than the global 
efforts to combat ozone depletion, both for developed and developing nations.146
137 Laura Thoms, supra note 3, at 823; see also Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 28, at 2-4, 
45; Cumberelege, supra note 6, at 316.
138 Laura Thoms, supra note 3, at 824.
139 Cumberlege, supra note 6, at 316.
140 Jasmine, supra note 124, at 512.
141 See, Id, at 513.
142 See, Susskind, supra note 2, at 66.
143 A Warming Warning, (2001). The Washington Post, Jan. 28, at B6; Jasmine, supra 
note 124, at 513
144 Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 28, at 11.
145 Cumberlege, supra note 6, at 317.
146 Green, supra note 5, at 282-283.
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Hence, mitigating the effects of climate change is accompanied by 
“unprecedented challenges, because it can only be achieved through 
extraordinary changes in the production and consumption of energy, thus 
affecting virtually all areas of economic activity.”147
A related aspect is the imbalance between “total costs of greenhouse-gas- 
emission abatement and total benefits of avoided undesirable consequences of 
global warming."148 In making the choice between continuing GHG emission 
and abating emission, countries will obviously choose to do that which presents 
a higher payoff.149 It is worth of note that developing nations that do not 
contribute much for the problem will be affected severely by the consequences 
of climate change more than the developed nations.150 Conversely, developed 
nations that caused the depletion of the ozone layer were the most to be affected 
by its effects.151 Hence, the incentive and cost-benefit analysis of combating 
climate change is quite different from that of ozone depletion even among 
developed nations.152
147 See Rudiger Wolfrum & Jurgen Friedrich, (2006). The Framework Convention on 
Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol, in Ensuring Compliance with Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements: A Dialogue between Practitioners and Academia, 53 
(Ulrich Beyerlin, Peter-Tobias Stoll & Rudiger Wolfrum eds,).
148 Cumberlege, supra note 6, at 323; Christoph Bohringer & Michael Finus, (2005).
The Kyoto Protocol: Success of Failure?, in Climate-change Policy, 254, at 258 
(Dieter Helm ed,).
149 Id, at 324.
150 For instance, some estimates that climate change will reduce the GDP of developing 
nations by 5% or more while it only reduces GDP of the developed by 1% or 2%. 
The Maldives, for example, which consists of 1200 islands lying, on average, two 
metres above sea-level, is an example of a country that could cease to exist in a 
hundred years due to rising sea levels. IPCC, Fourth Assessment Report, supra note 
31; Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 28, at 32.
151 Assessments show that though the effects of ozone depletion are spread across nation 
of the world, its effects, like increase in cancer case, eye cataract, defects in immune 
system, is much more severe in the developed north as the depletion is severe around 
the Northern Hemisphere, like Europe, Russia, USA, and remote South. As a result, 
developed nations were under the pressure from their own citizens, who are 
immediate victims of the problem resulted from their own activity. It has also been 
claimed that the light skin color of the North made them vulnerable to skin cancer, 
one of the adverse causes of ozone depletions. Hunter, supra note 14, at 567, 570­
571; Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 28, at 21.
152 Robert N. Stavins, (1997). ‘Policy Instruments for Climate Change: How Can 
National Governments Address a Global Problem?’ Univ. of Chi. Legal F. 298, at 
298; Id at 30- 34, and 48-49. US, for instance, is expected to incur a cost of US4 325 
billion for a benefit amounting only US$ 12 billion to comply for Kyoto with a
Accommodating the Interests of Developing Countries in the Climate Change Regime 27
In spite of the underlying differences between the two problems, lessons 
drawn from the ozone regime can be adapted and applied towards future 
achievements and successes in the climate change regime.153 We cannot, 
however, address the challenges in the climate change regime through a 
perfunctory application of the schemes used under the ozone regime, but by 
means of a tailored and pragmatic approach that considers the special 
circumstances of climate change problems discussed above.
3. Lessons for the Climate Change Regime
According to Thoms, the inherent nature of the climate change problem, 
including factors that are beyond the control of international negotiators “has 
weakened domestic support, strengthened opposition from industry and 
developing nations, turned the united states into a reluctant participant in 
international negotiations, and undermined negotiators' ability to implement 
trade restrictions.”154 Hence, given all the challenges faced by climate change 
negotiators, some even consider the emission reduction scheme reached so far as 
a remarkable success.155 Nonetheless, as highlighted below, the climate change 
regime can benefit from several factors that contributed to the success of the 
ozone regime with a view to accommodating and enhancing the meaningful 
participation of developing nations in the global pursuits to address the problem 
of climate change.156
negative net benefit. It is noted as well that there are some developed nations, such 
as Canada and Russia, who are net beneficiary of the climate change due to the 
effects of increased temperatures and precipitation on agricultural production. scott 
Berrett describes that “The USA failed to participate (at least in part) because the 
costs of participation were high. other countries agreed to participate (at least in 
part) because the costs to them of participating were low (as is true for some EU 
states), zero (as is true for all non-Annex I states) or even negative (as is true for the 
states given ‘hot air' allowances). The Annex I countries likely to have the hardest 
time complying (Canada and Japan) agreed to participate only on the condition that 
their initial reduction obligations be diluted.” Cumberlege, supra note 6, at 327, 
quoting, Scott Barrett, (2003). Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of 
Environmental Treaty-making, at 295.
153 Laura Thoms, supra note 3, at 796.
154 Id, at 843-844
155 Id.
156 Id, at 796 and 844.
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3.1. Sequential Approach to Developing Nations
One of the basic factors that contribute to the low-level of success of the climate 
change regime is the North-South dichotomy regarding ‘who-first, when, and 
how much’ in emission abating. Negotiators in the ozone regime solved this 
problem through mostly separate commitments of industrialized and 
developing nations with a sequential inclusion of parties.157 The more urgent 
issue of reaching binding controls on industrialized nations was resolved in the 
Montreal Protocol which also set the terms of future developing nations' 
participation (binding reductions with a ten-year implementation delay and the 
possibility of increased CFC production in the interim), followed by trade 
restrictions to assure compliance and enhance participation.158 The negotiators 
finally provided developing nations with the necessary incentives through a 
combination of trade restrictions and financial and technological transfers to 
ensure their participation in the ozone regime.159
Some urge that the ‘inclusive’ approach should be pursued in the climate 
change regime where developing nations are required to fully participate in the 
regime.160 Other writers, nonetheless, suggest that negotiators of climate change 
should adopt a sequential approach to the inclusion of industrialized and 
developing nations, for it is imperative to bind the most immediate source of the 
problem first - the industrialized nations - and then turn to the secondary issue of 
participation by developing nations.161 Otherwise, as has been witnessed in past 
negotiations, discussions may become bogged down and issues polarized.162 It 
is equally significant to resolve the reluctance of some industrialized nations in 
assuming responsibility under the pretext of equal participation by developing
157 Id, at 838.
158 Id.
159 Wettestad, supra note 136, at 143.
160 For instance, the US Senate, in the 1997 Byrd-Hagel Resolution, decided 
unanimously (95-0) for similar treatment of industrialized and developing countries 
in any climate change agreement and the existing short-term developing country’s’ 
participation through the CDM is short of the criteria required by the Byrd-Hagel 
Resolution. Stavins and Berrett, supra note 36, at 11-12; see also Steinar Andresen, 
(1998).
161 Laura Thoms, supra note 3, at 844.
162 For instance, the Byrd-Hagel resolution of US Senate comes before Kyoto 
negotiation affecting the interest and offers of negotiators to the protocol. Similarly, 
negotiating coalition strengthened with the formation of G-77 plus China that have a 
force to block the success of any agreement unless their interests are well 
considered. See Id, at 839-840 and 844; Peter Newell, (2000). Climate for Change, 
Non-State Actors and the Global Politics of the Greenhouse 9, at 13-18.
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nations by ensuring that developing nations would eventually join and agree to 
binding restrictions, which will allay the competitiveness concerns.163
Yet the existing flexible mechanisms devised under the Kyoto protocol do 
not efficiently address the competing interests involved in the climate change 
regime nor do they effectively enable a sequential approach to state participation 
(mostly due to regulatory uncertainties).164 Hence, Thoms proposes that the 
flexibility mechanisms should be exclusive and only those developing nations 
that join the regime should benefit from these schemes.165
This does not, however, entirely relieve developing countries from 
responsibilities and commitments because the high and rapidly growing GHG 
emissions of developing nations, which is different in degree from the ozone 
regime, creates a challenge for strictly applying the sequential approach 
followed in the ozone regime. one way of overcoming this challenge is 
determining equitable allocation of commitments based on the Human 
Development Index (HDI) combined with historic GHG emissions, energy use 
increases needed to improve low HDI and associated human poverty indices, 
and the efficiency with which energy is used, instead of per capita emissions 
that dominate the current negotiation.166 Thus, the average of the present per
163 Laura Thoms, supra note 3, at 845. A very typical example is USA’s position 
towards Kyoto Protocol..
164 of course, it provides automatic incentives for participation by some developing 
nations without direct financial input from parties Thus, at the Buenos Aires 
conference, Argentina became the first developing nation to assume binding targets 
and timetables for controlling emissions. similarly, nations such as Honduras, 
Nicaragua, and Panama have joined the protocol to become "emissions 
entrepreneurs," profiting from the protocol's joint implementation and clean 
development mechanisms. Seth Dunn, (1998). Can the North and South Get in 
Step?, World Watch, Nov./Dec.; see also William Stevens, (1998). Deadline Set to 
Form Rules for Reducing Gas Emissions, Sun-Sentinel Fort Lauderdale, at 11; Laura 
Thoms, supra note 3, at 845.
165 It is noted that “unless industrialized nations are certain that they will enter into 
effect and thereby induce involvement by developing nations, they will be reticent to 
agree to an approach that initially excludes the South. Similarly, unless developing 
nations are assured that the mechanisms will be implemented, they will not have the 
incentive to join the agreement.” Laura Thoms, supra note 3, at 845.
166 It is much easier for developing countries to argue on the basis of per capita emission 
which is difficult to be accepted by the developed North. on a per capita basis, the 
historic emissions of the United States (about 1,100 tons per person) are greater than 
those of China (about 66 tons per person) and india (about 23 tons per person). 
Though the gross footprints of some of developing countries are growing rapidly, 
the United States (20.4 tons per person) emits far more per person than China (3.8) 
or India (1.2). The per capita allocation have negative consequence like discouraging
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capita emissions of each country and the potential capacity of a country for 
future per capita emissions can be considered.167
This scheme transforms the current North-South blocks into three groups of 
countries, i.e. high emitter developed countries, low emitter developing 
countries, and high emitter developing countries, and they can all benefit 
according to their own marginal cost of mitigating climate change.168 For 
instance, countries with low emission allocations would be forced to utilize the 
flexible mechanisms by carrying out development projects in countries with 
high emission entitlements while poor low carbon emitting countries would 
derive economic development benefits through CDM options.169 Likewise, 
middle nations, such as China and india, would still have the ability to grow, 
and could use the available emission credit to attract significant capital 
investment from developed countries.170
3.2. Enhance Participation and Compliance
The Kyoto Protocol has been ratified by 191 countries and seems to have 
maintained very high participation of nations.171 Yet, the production of GHGs is
developed nations to join the regime and invest on climate change mitigation and 
adaptation, and will adversely affect developing yet high per capital emitter nations. 
See UNDP, Human Development Report for 2007/2008, supra note 57, at 40-41, at 
229-242, and 355-372; see also Albert Mumma and David Hodas, (2008). Designing 
A Global Post-Kyoto Climate Change Protocol That Advances Human 
Development, 20 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 619, at 638­
642; see also Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, (2009). Should Greenhouse Gas 
Permits Be Allocated On A Per Capita Basis? 97 California Law Review 51.
167 Mumma and Hodas, supra note 166, at 640.
168 The three groups of nations are countries with (1) historically low responsibility and 
low potential for future GHG emissions that would be entitled to the highest 
allocations of emissions (e.g. most African countries, small economies in Asia, and 
many of the small island states); (2) historically high responsibility for emissions 
and a high potential for future emissions would be allocated the lowest emissions 
entitlements (e.g. Annex I countries); and lastly (3) historically low responsibility 
for GHG emissions but high potential for future GHG emissions will be allocated 
with moderate emission entitlements (e.g. newly industrializing countries of China, 
India, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, etc). See Id, at 640-642.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Currently, there are 193 Parties (192 States and EU) to the Kyoto Protocol to the 
UNFCCC. The Protocol entered in force on 16 February 2005. 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php [last visited 
on August 27, 2011.]
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still increasing owing to factors like the withdrawal of major emitters, e.g. USA, 
from assuming any reduction commitment, failure of Kyoto signatory states 
from meeting their abatement commitment, and the exclusion of some major 
developing countries from the Kyoto commitment.172
Central to the problem is the meaning given and the actions that follow the 
principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” since Kyoto was 
ratified.173 Developing nations are asserting that all major GHG-emitting nations 
have a duty to protect and take preventive or corrective action because they 
caused the degradation, benefited from past pollution, and currently possess 
technological and financial advantages to address the problem.174 Some 
developed countries, like the US, however, urge that all major GHG emitters, 
like China, India and Brazil should assume commitments.175
Parties to the Montreal Protocol negotiating table overcame the North-South 
division by including the common but differentiated responsibility principle 
based on which all parties assume responsibility but developed nations incur 
more (differentiated) obligations.176 Accordingly, developing nations were 
allowed to delay the freeze and phase-out of ODSs for ten years, and the 
Montreal Protocol established and successfully implemented financial assistance 
and technology transfer schemes.177 The inclusion of such provisions was “an 
essential element of the strong consensus behind the Montreal Protocol” and 
forced China, India and Brazil to join the regime.178
Theoretically, the climate change regime gives due recognition to the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibility same as that of the ozone 
regime.179 First, the UNFCCC and subsequent negotiations provide a 
mechanism for financial assistance and transfer of environmentally sound
172 See, for example, Mumma and Honda, supra note 166, at 623; Andrew Schatz, supra 
note 54, at 533; and Cumberlege, supra note 6, at 320-321.
173 Lisa Schenck, supra note 42, at 367.
174 Id.
175 See Press Release, The White House, President Bush Discusses Global Climate 
Change, June 11, 2001, available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010611-2.html last visited on 
July 10, 2012.
176 See generally, for example, Weisslitz, supra note 7 where he argues that developing 
nations are proportionally treated in Montreal but not in Kyoto.
177 Montreal Protocol, supra note 19, art. 5, P 1; see also Laura Thoms, supra note 3, at 
811-12.
178 Laura Thoms, supra note 6, at 811-12; see also David Hurlbut, supra note 68, at 
352.; Wettestad, supra note 136, at 159.
179 Wettestad, supra note 136, at 231.
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technologies to developing nations.180 Moreover, the Kyoto Protocol excludes 
developing nations from any binding emission reduction and even creates the 
CDM that will assist developing nations in meeting the cost of adaptation.181 Yet 
all these incentives are too little to attract meaningful participation of 
developing nations.182 As a result, many writers agree that Kyoto’s 
commitments are “too little, too fast” or insufficient to avert the urgent problem, 
and insist on developing nations to play a more significant role over time.183
To secure meaningful participation of developing nations, additional 
incentives are recommended by different scholars. Stewart and Wiener 
recommended (1) a streamlined CDM;184 (2) voluntary participation in 
emissions trading without emission quotas; (3) mechanisms for voluntary 
accession to the emissions quota system; and (4) automatic graduation to the 
quota system given particular per capita incomes having been reached, or an 
income threshold above which nations must take on emission commitments.185 
Similarly, requiring them to participate in the financing of research and 
development activities (perhaps based on the UN scale of assessments) and to be
180 Press Release, (2009) Financial Support to Developing Countries for Climate 
Change: Is the EU Meeting its Previous Commitments? BRUSSELS/LONDON, 6 
April 2009, see also Laura Thoms, supra note 3, at 819-820;
181 Id.
182 Laura Thoms, supra note 3, at 812.
183 Stavins and Berrett, supra note 36, at 8.
184 This includes providing incentives for equitable geographical distribution and 
meaningful participation of developing countries, improving standards and speeding 
up paper works for project approval, ensuring continuity of projects post 2012, 
excluding certain types of projects according to their impacts on sustainable 
development, continuous monitoring and evaluating of project's contribution to 
sustainable development, an improved system of "continuous performance 
monitoring" for the third party certifiers that assess requests for registration and 
issuance, establishing new procedures for stakeholders to appeal against decisions 
and the like. See Harro van Asselt and Joyeeta Gupta, supra note 7, at 364-370;
see also James Murray, (23 Dec 2009). Business Green,
http://www.businessgreen.com/business-green/news/2255410/copenhagen-green- 
lights-plan/ last visited on July 10, 2012.
185 Stavins and Berrett, supra note 36, at 8, mentioning Stewart, Richard B. and 
Jonathan B. Wiener, (2001). “Reconstructing Climate Policy: The Paths Ahead.” 
Policy Matters, 01-23. Washington, DC: AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory 
Studies,; see also John Copeland Nagle, (2011). HOW MUCH SHOULD CHINA 
POLLUTE? From the 2011 Vermont Journal of Environmental Law Symposium: 
“China's Environmental Governance: Global Challenges and Comparative 
Solutions”, 12 Vt. J. Envtl. L. 591.
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bound by some technology standards (where the diffusion of these technologies 
would be financed by industrialized countries) are forwarded.186 In addition, the 
fact that any future negotiated outcomes are perceived as being fair to all parties 
serves as a self-incentive mechanism.187
On the other hand, many ratifying Annex-I nations, including Canada, Japan 
and the European union, are skeptical about meeting their commitment in the 
first reporting years.188 Different factors contribute to this, including the lack of 
accurate emission baselines, unequal advantages of nations when 1990 is taken 
as a baseline and emission leakage.189 With regard to unequal advantages, 
countries like Russia whose emission is reduced since 1990 benefit thereof 
while others such as the us whose emission increased in the past decades are at 
a disadvantage.
Yet, the atmosphere is a global commons that the world community should 
protect collectively thereby avoiding the ‘tragedy of the commons’.190 In the 
course of struggling to overcome a tragic outcome, equity issues, like free riding 
and the inequitable distribution of cost and benefits of collective action, pose 
difficulties for numerous nations.191 Hence, the existence of a strong legal 
regime (that brings all nations towards collective actions driven by gains and
186 Stavins and Berrett, supra note 36, at 9. These enable developing nations to benefit 
from innovations and their industries to look for options in the future for they will 
not keep on emitting GHGs and becoming energy inefficient.
187 See, Id, at 16.
188 John Browne, (July/August 2004), Beyond Kyoto, Foreign Affairs 20,; Lisa 
Schenck, supra note 42, at 333.
189 Lisa Schenck, supra note 42, at 333-334; see also Greg Kahn, Note, (2003). The Fate 
of the Kyoto Protocol Under the Bush Administration, 21 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 548, at 
556; See Scott Barrett, (2005). Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of 
Environmental Treaty-Making 382. Emission leakage is defined as “a phenomenon 
which occurs when businesses move their operations and accompanying emissions 
to unregulated countries to avoid the expenses of obtaining emission-reduction 
technology”.
190 See Garrett Hardin, (1968) The Tragedy of the Commons, Science, New Series, Vol. 
162, No. 3859 (Dec. 13, 1968), pp. 1243-1248; Mancur Olson, (1965) The Logic of 
Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups; Todd Sandler, (2004) 
Global Collective Action 11; Id,, at 335-336.
191 Free-riding occurs when some parties bear the costs of an action, while others, the 
free-riders, bear no burden, but still enjoy the benefits while inequitable distribution 
of cost and benefits arise where a large emitter reduces its emissions and incurs huge 
costs to the benefit of all other nations that will enjoy cleaner air. Lisa Schenck, 
supra note 42, at 335-337.
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demonstrable net benefits, and perceived equitable apportionment of burdens) is 
indispensable.192
To combat the problem of free-riding that plagues efforts to address this 
global concern, positive incentives for participation and compliance should be 
accompanied by credible and sufficiently severe disincentives.193 Hence, 
reciprocity or reciprocal measures, financial penalties and self-punishment and 
trade restriction that contributed to the success of the ozone regime could be 
adopted.194 The climate regime, however, does not include any of these trade 
measures that have partly contributed for the withdrawal of the US, failure of 
signatory states from meeting reduction commitments, failure of developing 
nations to assume any responsibility, and fueled arguments by industry blocking 
coalitions regarding anti-competitiveness and leakage.195
The fact that ODSs are man-made chemicals produced for industrial use 
while greenhouse gases are mostly industrial byproducts emitted as externalities 
of certain processes will complicate the latter and might conflict with the 
GATT.196 Consequently, redesigning the climate change regime to include trade 
restrictions and integrating the two competing realms of international trade and 
environmental law is necessary.197
192 See Daniel C. Esty & Robert Mendelsohn, (1998). Moving from National to 
International Environmental Policy, 31 Pol'y Sci. 225, at 225.
193 Stavins and Berrett, supra note 36, at 19; see also Mark E. Rosen, (2010). Energy 
Independence And Climate Change: The Economic And National Security 
Consequences Of Failing To Act, 44 U. Rich. L. Rev. 977.
194 Id, at 20-22. Though there was not any practical trade restriction in ozone regime, 
the belief that trade would be restricted if countries failed to participate had 
promoted participation by providing market incentives to join and prevented non­
parties from enjoying a competitive advantage and thus deterred leakage of CFC 
production facilities to non-parties. In addition, legal expert from the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") secretariat affirmed that the trade 
restrictions under Montreal were permitted. Benedick, supra note 4, at 91;
195 Laura Thoms, supra note 3, at 842.
196 Thus, climate change negotiators cannot follow the example of the ozone regime and 
place restrictions on the trading of the offending substance itself. Trade restrictions 
in the climate change regime will have to be placed primarily on products with 
production processes that emit greenhouse gases. This will not only be more difficult 
to monitor, but will also run into challenges under the world Trade Organization 
("WTO") system, which tends to disfavor restrictions based on differences in 
production processes. Laura Thoms, supra note 3, at 843 mentioning David Victor, 
(2001). The Collapse of the Kyoto Protocol and the Struggle to Slow Global 
Warming, 42-43.
197 Id, at 850.
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The ‘target and timetable’ approach of the ozone regime, which is not well 
designed in the climate change regime, was very useful by sending a regulatory 
signal to CFC producers that investment in alternatives would be profitable.198 
Instead of the short-sighted emissions target, future climate change negotiations 
should devise a long-term ‘target and timetable’ that will send an accurate 
message to industries. it is also important to provide industries with positive 
market incentives, disable their position by breaking up blocking coalitions, and 
delegitimize industry discourse for minimizing its pressure.199 Hence, 
governments are called upon to adequately respond to the rhetoric of industrial 
opposition in the climate regime with media campaigns regarding its science, 
adverse effects, economic competitiveness etc and device means to deal with 
free riders. Since lack of public concern can pressurize national governments 
from assuming responsibilities, norm-building efforts on the climate change 
issue must be developed.200
Norm-building activities, efforts toward industry fragmentation,201 and more 
state and federal climate change legislation could potentially result in U.S.
198 Ozone regime clearly determined the phase-out schedule of ODS and producers 
know that these products will not survive in the market unless changed by its 
substitutes. This triggered CFC producing industries to get together in Washington 
only four months after the negotiation of Montreal to exchange information and 
invest on research and development for the invention of substitutes. Huge amount of 
many are invested for it by different companies to produce competitive or low- 
priced CFC substitutes where DuPont alone invested $30 million on research and 
development of CFC substitutes. Laura Thoms, supra note 3, at 810; Lisa Schenck, 
supra note 42; Benedick, supra note 4, at 6, 47, 53; Wettestad, supra note 136, at 
132 and 137
199 Laura Thoms, supra note 3, at 846. Unlike the ozone regime where industries like 
DuPunt were in the forefront for finding substitutes and mobilizing the public 
against CFC, industrial rhetoric is going the opposite direction in the climate change 
regime. As Thoms observes, “industry climate change rhetoric has held a privileged 
position; themes of scientific uncertainty, economic disaster, and the threat of 
leakage and loss of competitive advantage to developing nations have pervaded 
public discourse and prevented U.S. action.”
200 it has been mentioned that British industries have started this task by singling out 
carbon dioxide emissions as the environmental "bad." Thus, Amerada Hess is selling 
zero carbon gasoline and the Carbon Trust has begun to develop zero carbon labels 
for industrial products, both with the intention of using the term "zero carbon" as a 
tool for gaining a marketing advantage. See Id, 851-52; last visited on August 27, 
2010; Michael Grubb et al., (1999). The Kyoto Protocol: A Guide and Assessment 
73, at 258-60.
201 Under the disguise of scientific uncertainty, economic disaster, and the threat of 
leakage and loss of competitive advantage to developing nations, industrial rhetoric
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accession to the climate change regime at least after 2012.202 However, looking 
at the urgency of action required of nations “successful global action will 
depend upon nations' successes in reaching definitional agreement than in 
crafting theoretical justifications for continued inaction.”203 Hence, emission 
reduction targets that are modest in the short-term but that steadily increase in 
stringency; mechanisms such as growth targets intended to increase developing 
country participation over time; and the use of market-based instruments are 
devices that can achieve, if implemented successfully, climate goals at relatively
low cost.204
3.3. Economic Assistance and Technology Transfer
The issue of financial aid to developing countries for adaptation and mitigation 
of climate change problems were high since the UNFCCC negotiation. Hence, 
under the UNFCCC, developed nations agreed to make available “new and 
additional financial resources” to developing countries “on a grant or 
concessional basis” or through bilateral, regional and other multilateral channels 
which is operational through Global Environmental Facility (GEF).205
GEF, the financial administrator for climate change regime, operates under 
regular replenishments of its GEF Trust Fund by donor countries for three to 
four years.206 In addition to its Trust Fund, the GEF manages two special 
climate-related funds established under the Bonn/Marrakesh agreements: the 
Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF)207 and the Least Developed Countries
has got a privileged position. In addition, industrial blockings like coalitions of fossil 
fuel, utility, chemical, and automobile industries are formed to block international 
agreement. Laura Thoms, supra note 3, at 857-859.
202 Id.
203
204
205
206
207
Lisa Schenck, supra note 42, at 368.
Stavins and Berrett, supra note 36, at 26.
UNFCCC, supra note 37, at Article 4(3), 11(1), 11(5) and 21(3). The Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) was set up in October 1991 to assist the protection of 
the global environment and to promote environmental sustainable development in 
the World Bank. Later on, in 1994, the GEF was restructured and moved out of the 
world Bank system to become a permanent and separate institution. 
http://www.thegef.org/gef/ last visited on Sept 12, 2011.
See, Id, at 3.
The Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) was created to help funding 
complementary to that GEF as part of its climate change adaptation and technology 
transfer areas. See Climate Change Secretariat, A Guide to the Climate Change 
Convention and its Kyoto Protocol, at 15 (2002), available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/guideconvkp-p.pdf (preliminary version); see also Laura
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Fund (LDCF).208 The fourth and related fund attached to Kyoto under the 
UNFCCC is the Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund (KPAF) which is established 
under the Bonn/Marrakesh package to provide funding for concrete adaptation 
projects and programs in member developing countries from the ‘share of 
proceeds’ from CDM.209
To strengthen such funds, parties in the Bonn Declaration agreed “to 
contribute a total of USD 410 million per year by 2005 with this level to be 
reviewed again in 2008” and such fund to be directed towards the SCCF, the 
LDCF or the KPAF.210 But so far, as of January 2009, only USD 278 million 
has been given to the first two funds, i.e. SCCF and LDCF, by donor countries, 
but nothing to the KPAF due to the contentions over its administration.211 
Moreover, though parties are duty bound to communicate such financial 
information related to implementation, lack of transparency, inadequacy of 
information and sometimes absence of the same and non-existence of official
Thoms, supra note 3, at 819-820; and Marc Pallemaerts and Jonathan Armstrong, 
(2009). Financial Support To Developing Countries For Climate Change Mitigation 
And Adaptation: Is The EU Meeting Its Commitments? Paper Presented at the 
International Conference on the External Dimension of the EU’s Sustainable 
Development Strategy, 28 January 2009, Brussels, Institute for European 
Environmental Policy, at 3.
208 The Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) is specifically oriented towards 
helping the 48 Least Developed Countries (LDCs) establish and implement National 
Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) for a fight against the adverse effects of 
climate change. As of 2009, 15 donor countries have pledged over USD 172 million 
to the LDCF. See, Id, at 4.
209 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 43, at article 12. Following verification of the results of 
CDM projects, the CDM Executive Board, governing body of the CDM, issues 
certified emission reductions (CERs) for each tonne of Co2 equivalent saved to the 
host country of the project. out of the amount of certified emission reductions 
(CERs) generated by each CDM project, 98% are issued to the project sponsors and 
credited towards the fulfillment of the investor country's commitments while a 
"share of proceeds" amounting to 2% of CERs is in the name of the KPAF and sold 
to fund adaptation projects in developing countries. As of today KPAF does not 
sponsor a single project. If the system works well the fund has the potential to 
collect USD 80-300 million from a ‘share of proceeds’ with in the period 2008­
2012; See Harro van Asselt and Joyeeta Gupta, supra note7, at 345-370; Pallemaerts 
and Armstrong, supra note 207, at 4.
210 Bonn Declaration, which has been signed by 21 nations, formed an essential element 
of the Bonn Agreement which paved the way for the successful conclusion of the 
negotiations on the 'Buenos Aires Plan of Action' at COP7 in Marrakesh a few 
months later.
211 Pallemaerts and Armstrong, supra note 207, at 5 and 6.
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reports prevent many from fully evaluating the degree of attainment of the 
commitment included under the Bonn Declaration.212
The new Copenhagen Accord creates a “collective commitment” for 
developed countries to provide “new and additional resources ... approaching 
USD 30 billion” for the 2010-2012 period,213 and sets a longer-term collective 
‘goal’ of mobilizing USD 100 billion per year by 2020 from all sources.214 It 
also established the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund “as an operating entity of 
the Convention's financial mechanism”.215
Understanding that technology transfer is key for the regime,216 Articles 4.5 
and 4.7 of the UNFCCC and 10(c) of the Kyoto Protocol call for developed 
nations to “promote, facilitate, and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or
212 UNFCCC, COP5, ‘Review of the Implementation of Commitments and of other 
Provisions of the Convention: UNFCCC guidelines on reporting and review’, 
16/02/2000, at 92; see also Article 12 of UNFCCC, supra note 37, and Article 7 of 
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 43; Id, at 15-16; see also Press Release, supra note 180.
213 Though data are not conclusive and times are left to meet the commitment, analysts 
are skeptical about the $10 billion US contribution by the year 2010. For instance, 
out of $2.5 billion expected share, President Barack Obama put out a budget request 
for only $1.4 billion in international climate finance in February. In contrast, EU has 
pledged $3.3 billion a year in quick-start funds, yet has promised to detail how it is 
adhering to its finance goal. However since, the administration of the fund, possible 
beneficiaries, conditions attached to the fund, respective obligation of developing 
nations are not yet settled, it is unlikely that the fund will attain its ends by the end 
of the first term. Confusion About Copenhagen Accord Casts Cloud Over UN 
Climate Treaty; Hopes for Trust-Building, Fast-Start Financing Dashed at Bonn by 
Stacy Feldman - Apr 12th, 2010.
214 The sources are designated us public and private, bilateral and multilateral without 
specifying the shares of nations and its administration, but links this money to 
“meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation.” UN, however, 
projects $50-70bn a year to be invested immediately to help the poor countries adapt 
to extreme floods, droughts and heat-waves, with much more needed later. 
Copenhagen Accord, supra note 51, article 8; see also Daniel Bodansky, supra note 
48, at 237.
215 Id, at article 10.
216 In the context of climate change, technology transfer is defined as the “flows of 
know-how, experience and equipment for mitigating and adapting to climate change 
amongst different stakeholders.” Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
(2000). Summary For Policymakers, In IPCC Special Report: Methodological and 
Technological Issues In Technology Transfer 3; See also Alexander Adam, (2009). 
Technology Transfer to Combat Climate Change: Opportunities And Obligations 
Under Trips And Kyoto, 9 Journal of High Technology Law 1.
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access to,” environmentally sound technologies.217 Furthermore, developing 
countries made it very clear in the Bali Action Plan of 2007 that technology 
transfer is very crucial for their inclusion in the emission reduction scheme.218 
Accordingly, “developing countries agree to take measurable, reportable, and 
verifiable actions regarding emissions, on the condition that developed countries 
offer assistance to them with measurable, reportable, and verifiable financing, 
technology, and capacity building.”219 However, implementation is yet in its 
infant stage owing to different factors, including the potential conflict with 
international trade agreements.220 Although CDM is not a mechanism meant for 
technology transfer, developing countries can benefit from technology transfer 
as a side effect.221
The establishment of the Montreal Multilateral Fund, proportionate 
contribution by developed signatory states, technology transfer schemes 
implemented in most developing counties, like China, Brazil and india, and 
technical assistance delivered across the world in the ozone protection regime 
contributed to the rapid phase-out or reduction of many ODSs.222 The financial 
assistance and technology transfer scheme built into the climate regime, 
however, is far from being comprehensive, sufficient and attractive.223 Problems
217 UNFCCC, supra note 37, article 4.5 and 4.7; Kyoto Protocol, supra note 43, at 
article 10(c).
218 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference of the 
Parties, Thirteenth Session, Bali, Indonesia, Dec. 3-15, 2007, Decision 1/CP.13: Bali 
Action Plan, (1)(b)(i)-(ii), U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (Mar. 14, 2008), 
available at http:// unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/cop13/eng/06a01.pdf.
219 Mei Gechlik, (2009). Making Transfer of Clean Technology Work: Lessons of the 
Clean Development Mechanism, 11 San Diego International Law Journal 227, at 
229.
220 see, for example, Cameron Hutchison, (2006). Does TRiPs Facilitate or impede 
Climate Change Technology Transfer into Developing Countries? 3 University of 
Ottawa Law & Technology Journal 517; see also Alexander Adam, supra note 216. 
Though TRIPS (Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights) will pose an enormous challenge to the transfer of EsT in its full sense, 
scholars are finding lee ways to the challenge that encourages the two realms, 
environmental law and world trade to work together.
221 Alexander Adam, supra note 216.
222 See Cass R. Sunstein, (2008). Of Montreal And Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 38 
Environmental Law Reporter News & Analysis 10566, at 10568; Laura Thoms, 
supra note 3, at 811.
223 See for example, Alexander Adam, supra note 216; K.Ravi Srinivas, (2009). Climate 
Change, Technology Transfer and Intellectual Property Rights, Research 
Information System Discussion Paper (RIS-DP # 153), RIS, at 1.
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ranging from lack of commitment from donors, absence of comprehensive and 
effective institutions to administer climate change funds (many less effective 
funds are created compared to the single Montreal Multilateral Fund in the 
ozone regime), challenges posed by international trade, and lack of sufficient 
funds (which of course is much more than what was required by the ozone 
regime) prevent the mechanisms from lending much support to the climate 
change regime.224
3.4. Enhance Political Commitment
Given the degree of climate change problems, Anthony Giddens explains that, 
“at present we have no effective politics of climate change, especially at a 
national level [strong enough to resist the challenge from home] where much of 
the action must happen.”225 Similarly, Leo Brincat is skeptical about the 
existence of strong political will that would lead to a long lasting climate 
agreement in the near future.226 Only stronger and credible leadership and better 
communication, higher sense of social justice between all the parties concerned, 
and the integration of international commitments in the national legislation and 
effective implementation of the same would bring the long awaited change in 
the climate regime.227
224 See for example Pallemaerts and Armstrong, supra note 207. For instance, nearly 
$18bn (£12.5bn) have been pledged in the last seven years by donors, “but less than 
$0.9bn has been disbursed and long delays are plaguing many funds.” Equitable 
distribution of the fund is the other problem where nearly one-third of the $760m 
distributed in the last three years by GEF, has gone to China, India and Brazil and 
less than $100m of this has gone to projects in the world's 49 poorest countries. John 
Vidal, (2009). Rich nations failing to meet climate aid pledges, the Guardian; 
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/feb/20/climate-funds- 
developing-nations/ last visited on August 26, 2011.
225 Anthony Giddens, (2008). The Politics of Climate Change: National Responses to 
the Challenge of Global Warming, 5 (Policy Network Paper, UK, London). 
Available at http://www.policynetwork.net/uploadedFiles/Publications/Publications/. 
The_politics_of_climate_change_Anthony_Giddens%282%29.pdf/ last visited on 
January, 2010.
226 Malta today, (2010). without strong political commitment, fight against climate 
change can never be won, Leo Brincat, addressing in the meeting of the International 
ParliamentaryCommonwealth Conference with the theme ‘TheChallenges of Climate 
Change’ in London, Charlot Zahra reporting, 17 February, 2010, available at 
http://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/without-strong-political-commitment- 
fight-against-climate-change-can-never-be-won-%E2%80%93-br. Last visited on 
Sept 13, 2011.
227 Id.
Accommodating the Interests of Developing Countries in the Climate Change Regime 41
Various political analysts describe the existing political system and 
commitment too weak to bring the required change in the climate change 
regime, and suggest an increased role for the state.228 To achieve such a role, 
some prefer ‘ensuring state’ over ‘enabling state’.229 The difference is that in the 
‘enabling state’ system, state machineries are confined to stimulate others to act 
and let them go on with it while in the ‘ensuring state’ system, state machineries 
are expected to make sure that processes achieve certain defined outcomes, like 
emission reduction targets.230 It is also noted that good democratic leadership, 
motivated by ‘deliberative democracy’, should not be confined to policymaking 
alone but should also educate constituents about pressing issues such as climate 
change, that may not be apparent to them.231
Changes in national leadership also apathetically influences the degree of 
political commitment a nation assumes whereas the presence of continuous and 
uninterrupted domestic policies play a significant role for the effective 
realization of international obligations and long term objectives.232 This is 
because when obligations such as commitments towards climate change 
mitigation are particularly onerous, individual nations will adhere to them “only 
insofar as those nations perceive that positive net benefits...will be 
forthcoming.”233 For instance, fluctuation in the national policy of the US due to 
changes in political administration has prevented it from assuming a leadership 
role while it is the largest GHG emitter.234 Similarly, changes in government 
policies are affecting projects to be implemented in GHG emission mitigation in 
Germany and Canada.235
228 Giddens, supra note 225, at 9 and 16.
229 Id, at 9.
230Id.
231 David Held & Angus Fane Hervey, (2009). Democracy, climate change and global 
governance: Democratic agency and the policy menu ahead, Policy Network Papers, 
UK, London, at 8. This is especially true for nations like USA that is facing firm, 
fixed and protective public opinion towards emission reduction. see Cass R. 
Sunstein, supra note 28, at 45-46.
232 Lisa Schenck, supra note 42, at 332.
233 Id, at 332.
234 For example, on April 21, 1993, President Clinton in introducing The Climate 
Change Action Plan stated "Today, I... announce our nation's commitment to 
reducing our emissions of greenhouse gases to their 1990 levels by the year 2000." 
White House, (1993), The Climate Change Action Plan: Executive Summary. 
However, his successor, President George Bush has notified the world that USA will 
not ratify the Kyoto Protocol.
235 Lisa Schenck mentions Germany's recent action that exempted its coal industry from 
the European Union's carbon trading program that was designed to ensure Protocol
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Held and Hervey recommend multiple tasks both for individual states 
(developing and developed) and the international community to transform 
global climate change politics.236 They suggest that, individual states should 
garner their governance towards the broadening and deepening of the 
deliberative process, transform private preferences via a process of deliberation 
into positions that can withstand public scrutiny and test, continually involve 
citizens and civil society in the making and delivery of policy, create leadership 
that confronts narrow interests, and set out compelling scientific and economic 
case for action.237 They also underline that the international community should 
promote inclusive and broadly representative global decision-making channels, 
assist developing countries to access the necessary resources, capacity and 
technology for mitigation and adaptation, broaden the existing mandate of the 
GEF, and increase the status and responsibility of the UNEP by upgrading it 
onto a specialized UN agency.238
Some political leaders mention factors like scientific uncertainty, ‘tragedy of 
the commons’ or the free-rider problem as a pretext to veil the immense 
challenges they face from home, i.e. the public, large corporations and labor 
associations.239 Scientific uncertainty about climate change cannot, however, 
serve as a justification because the principle of precaution obliges them to act 
regardless of the degree of scientific certainty or estimated cost.240
Although the political commitments during the different stages of the 
negotiation and implementation of ozone depletion regime are very crucial,
compliance and Canada’s action that transferred funding away from Protocol 
implementation projects to commuter tax credits support. Conversely, change in the 
political administration of the country, of course, helped Australia to ratify the 
Kyoto Protocol in 2007. Lisa Schenck, supra note 42, at 331-332
236 Held and Hervey, supra note 231, at 2-17.
237 Id, at 17.
238 Id, at 15-17.
239 Jason Scott Johnston, (2009). Problems of Equity and Efficiency in The Design of 
International Greenhouse Gas Cap-And-Trade Schemes, 33 Harvard Environmental 
Law Review, 423, at 426; Environment and Globalization, A Project of Levin 
Institute, at 32, available at http://www.globalization101.org. Accessed on January 
10, 2010; But much positive effort is made by some nations, like USA and China to 
advocate and fund ‘Green Job’ by domestic frameworks. Regan, supra note 98, at 
251, 271-72, 277-78.
240 Lisa Schenck, supra note 42, at 366; see also Christopher D. Stone, (2001). Is there a 
Precautionary Principle? 31 ELR 10790.
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global and national politics was not a stiff challenge to the ozone regime.241 
Acting even during scientific uncertainties was the center of the ozone regime as 
nations agreed to reduce production and consumption of ODS at a time when 
there were many unanswered questions in science, such as the uncertainty 
regarding the existence of substitutes for many uses of ODS.242
Conclusion
The high economic cost of reducing GHG emissions, few scientific 
uncertainties, lack of feasible and low-cost energy substitutes, and the allocation 
in share of responsibilities for developed and developing nations are the 
principal impediments against global consensus in the climate change regime. 
The fact that some developing nations have become high emitters as well as 
major economic competitors of developed nations has contributed to the 
problem. As a result, some developed nations like the US have failed to assume 
responsibility in the Kyoto protocol claiming that high emitter developing 
nations like India, China and Brazil should also assume reduction commitments. 
This poses a formidable challenge in the consensus (that is long overdue) toward 
solving the problem of climate change.
The ozone layer regime has, however, successfully resolved the North-south 
dichotomy by allocating a fair share of responsibility to both groups and 
implementing the same, which can also be adopted in the climate change 
regime. it is important to note that there exists a very clear difference between 
ozone and climate problems, and hence mechanisms devised under the Montreal 
regime cannot be directly transplanted to the climate change regime. But, these 
good practices can be taken as lessons in the design of future agreements in the 
climate regime.
As discussed above, sequential approach to developing nations, enhancing 
participation and compliance, redesigning the financial assistance and 
technology transfer regimes, and re-structuring the global politics of climate 
change are some of the solutions that can positively contribute towards an 
effective climate change regime. This enhances the applicability of the principle 
of ‘common but differentiated responsibility’ and allocates equitable share of 
responsibilities both for the developed, emitter developing and non-emitter 
developing nations. Accordingly, developed nations are expected to assume
241 Donald Kaniaru, Rajendra Shende, Durwood Zaelke, (2008). Landmark Agreement 
to Strengthen Montreal Protocol Provides Powerful Climate Mitigation, 8 
Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol'y 46.
242 Jorge E. Vinuales, (2010). Legal Techniques For Dealing With Scientific 
Uncertainty In Environmental Law, 43 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 
437, at 453-455.
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immediate reduction commitments, pledge economic assistance and facilitate 
technology transfer to developing nations under the condition that developing 
nations will assume responsibility later. Under such schemes, developing 
nations will not be totally relieved from commitment but will assume some 
responsibility based on their historic share of responsibility, economic capacity, 
amount of current emission and rank on the human development index.243
Meanwhile, the politics of climate change need to be redesigned and local 
governments should enhance the awareness of their public, industry and labor 
associations; they should also stand firmly against pressures on the climate 
regime.244 Adequate fund is apparently needed for research and development 
towards renewable (and low-cost) energy alternatives and minimizing transition 
costs. working toward energy alternatives is underway in both developed and 
developing nations245 as an integral part of the green movements in all countries. 
These pursuits indeed mark the advent of new value systems and development 
paradigms the pace of which determine the prospects and magnitude of 
achievements in the climate change regime. _________ ■
243 See, Human Development Report, supra note 57, at 40-41, at 229-242, and 355-372; 
Mumma and Hodas, supra note 166, at 638-642; see also Posner and Sunstein, supra 
note 166.
244 Reports show that public awareness is increasing. For instance, in USA “The idea of 
buying green has become popular, and books and magazine articles on going green 
are everywhere” and ‘green’ is becoming most popular trade mark. Roger R. 
Martella, Jr. (2010). Climate Change Along The Northeast Corridor: How 
Washington And New York Are Approaching And Preparing For Greenhouse Gas 
Controls, 18 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 14, at 31-32.
245 in the renewable energy sector, for instance, developing countries are investing more 
than developed countries where China is in the forefront and india experienced the 
fastest expansion rate in 2011. Ethiopia also adopted its own green economy strategy 
with the view of building a climate resilient green economy. See UNEP, (2011). 
Global Trends in Renewable Energy Investment 2011: Analysis of Trends and Issues 
in the Financing of Renewable Energy, United Nations Environment Programme and 
Bloomberg New Energy Finance; Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, (2011). 
Ethiopia’s Climate-Resilient Green Economy: Green economy strategy; The Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Environmental Protection Authority, (2011), 
Ethiopia’s Vision for a Climate Resilient Green Economy available at
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